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One of the many attractions of South Africa post-1996 is its apparent ability to allow the 
coexistence of both religious and non-religious values in society. Among the many religions in 
South Africa, Christianity has always held a prominent position. In both the past and the 
present, the influence of Christianity politically, socially and morally has been significant. This 
study focuses on the influence of Christian values post-1996. A critical examination of the 
post-1996 interplay between religious freedom and other non-religious rights and freedoms 
shows that certain Christian values have given rise to a predicament in which there is a clash 
of rights. The clash of rights arises from the fact that certain rights and democratic values are 
infringed upon by some Christian values in society. This indicates that the role of Christian 
values in society and how far such values can be permitted in society remains unclear.  
The study seeks to track – and unpack – the above predicament or clash of rights with reference 
to the writings of selected key thinkers and three judgements of the Constitutional Court 
relating to the problem. The predicament and the unclear position of Christian values partly 
caused by a conflict of religious and non-religious rights in South Africa is the impetus for this 
research and the contribution it seeks to make. In that regard, the study will explore and 
critically analyse the possibility of overcoming the predicament or conflict of rights arising 
from the influence of certain Christian values in South Africa post-1996.  By exploring three 
Constitutional Court cases which will be used as case studies and the views of key thinkers on 
this study area, an interpretation of religious freedom and what it entails will be reached. 
I will discuss and analyse what I consider to be the three strategies being used in contemporary 
scholarship and legal systems to deal with the predicament. Although the reconciling or 
balancing of conflicting rights is evident from current scholarly discussions and judicial 
decisions, the notion of exemption is also considered. Further, the concept of an objective 
appeal to public reason which this study considers as being primarily based on the three 
democratic values of equality, human dignity and freedom will be emphasised. The centrality 
of this notion, which this study considers as central in transcending the stipulated predicament 
or conflict of rights, needs emphasis due to the fact that public reason precedes the values of a 
particular religious institution as Lenta rightly upholds.  From this perspective, this study will 
stress that only those Christian values which are not contrary to democratic values and do not 
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Christian values often play a significant role in the public sphere. In the context of this study, 
“the public sphere” refers to South African society in terms of both the law regulating the 
general public and its citizens who do not directly belong to a particular Christian institution 
or organisation. This involves the ability of Christian values to influence the enactment and 
application of public policies and morals instituted by legal systems, especially in terms of how 
the secular law should be constructed.1  Further, “public sphere” also denotes the extent to 
which citizens who are not Christian, or by extension, who do not belong to any religion are 
influenced by certain Christian values.2  
Christian values are regarded as primary principles that guide and regulate a good Christian 
living. Christian values are not only part of believers’ identity as Christians, they are also linked 
to Divine law which is often perceived as obligatory. Since Christian values are based on beliefs 
and doctrines, they are considered categorical and authoritative. For example, the prohibition 
of same-sex marriages is often perceived as a central Christian value based on the emphasis to 
safeguard marriage between a male and a female. Given that almost eighty percent3 of the 
South African population claim to be Christian, the place of Christian values in the enactment 
and application of public policy and in generally applying laws cannot be underestimated.  
In South Africa, some Christian institutions have been attempting to influence society with 
their values. The word “influence” in this study refers to the ability of Christian institutions4 to 
approve or disapprove certain issues of public policy and moral order in society. Such an 
influence is based on religious values which are regarded as central by Christians. In pre-1990 
apartheid South Africa, Christian values influenced society and the political system in one way 
or the other. The State justified the apartheid system using Christian values from the 
perspective of pro-apartheid churches such as the Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk (NGK) 
which had secured a close relationship with the state, acting as an established church of the 
                                                          
1 This is reflected in Minister of Home Affairs and Another v Fourie and Another (CCT 60/04) [2005] ZACC 19) 
/ [1 SA 524 [2006]. 
2 This is reflected in Christian Education South Africa V Minister of Education, [2000 (4) SA 757 (CC)] and De 
Lange v Presiding Bishop of the Methodist Church of Southern Africa for the Time Being and Another 
(CCT223/14) [2015] ZACC 35) / [2015] ZACC 35. 
3 SouthAfrica.info, 2015. South Africa's Population. [Online webpage]. Available from <http://www.southafrica. 
info/about/people/population.htm#.WByGO_l97Dd>. [Assessed 2 October 2016].  
4 Christian institutions are church-based organisations formed for a certain cause. In the context of this study, the 
notion of Christian institutions will apply to Christian organisations that will be mentioned when dealing with the 
Constitutional Court cases in the second chapter such as the Marriage Alliance of South Africa and Christian 




Nationalist Party government. Similarly, struggle fighters and liberation movements used 
certain anti-apartheid Christian institutions such as the South African Council of Churches 
(SACC) to oppose the apartheid system. During the period of transition between 1990 and 
1995, Christian institutions actively facilitated the process of reconciliation and political 
negotiations.  
In South Africa’s post-1996 democratic context, the Constitution as the highest law clearly 
stipulates different rights and freedoms which citizens possess and which ought to be respected. 
One of the rights which is clearly stipulated by the Constitution is the “right to freedom of 
religion” spelt out under Section 14 (1) and substantiated by other constitutional stipulations 
such as Sections 15(2), 30(1) and 15(3) concerning religious belief and observance. The 
constitutional rights and freedoms linked to religion have been used by some Christian 
institutions to foster Christian values in society. In that sense, it is through the constitutional 
guarantees of religious freedom that some Christian institutions have been attempting to 
influence society with Christian values. In the process, other constitutionally protected rights 
and democratic values may be violated. How to reconcile the Constitutional rights regarding 
religious freedom of belief and observance through which some Christian institutions influence 
society with their values and other rights which are violated in the process is a daunting and 
complex issue.  
How can one reconcile the place of Christian values and their influence in society based on the 
constitutionally protected “right to freedom of religion” on the one hand and the infringement 
of other rights which such an influence cause? Alternatively, in what way can one understand 
and transcend the predicament or conflict of rights arising from the influence of certain 
Christian values in society in South Africa post-1996 context? This stated predicament 
indicates that the rights concerning freedom of religion which uphold religious liberty and how 
far it may influence society needs to be examined. The second chapter of this study explore 
three Constitutional Court cases as case studies where the influence of certain Christian values 
seems to have affected negatively other rights and the democratic values of equality, human 
dignity and freedom. The cases to be explored in the second chapter are Christian Education 
South Africa V Minister of Education,5 Minister of Home Affairs and Another v Fourie and 
                                                          




Another,6 and De Lange v Presiding Bishop of the Methodist Church of Southern Africa for the 
Time Being and Another.7  
The three Constitutional Court cases will clearly demonstrate the already affirmed conflict of 
rights arising from the influence of certain Christian values in South Africa post-1996. The 
Constitutional Court’s construing of religious freedom and the views of key thinkers such as 
Pienaar, Lenta, Mofokeng, du Plessis, Van Der Schyff and van der Vyver will be central to this 
study. Both internal and external aspects of religious freedom will be explored in the third 
chapter. While the internal aspect of religious freedom concerns one’s liberty to adopt or to 
adhere to certain religious values or beliefs, the external aspect of religious freedom concerns 
the application of such beliefs or values through practice or observance. Given that the external 
aspect of religious freedom sometimes affects other rights of third parties in society, this study 
will assert that this aspect is limited or that it ought to be limited.  
With regard to the approaches for transcending the predicament arising from the influence of 
certain Christian values in society, three strategies will be identified and explored. Firstly, there 
have been attempts to reconcile the concerned Christian values with non-religious rights and 
freedoms that are infringed. Through the “proportionality principle”, one may balance differing 
conflicting rights especially in cases where this can be done without any rights being violated. 
Secondly, the possibility of granting an exemption can be considered. Thirdly, the notion of 
public reason is central. Through what will be dubbed “justifiable exemption”, the possibility 
of granting an allowance to certain Christian institutions to influence society with their values 
might be viable. Such a possibility might not be feasible in cases where such an influence 
infringes upon other constitutionally guaranteed rights. The three strategies will be analysed in 
accord with Constitutional Court sentiments regarding religious freedom and the views and 
arguments of the affirmed leading thinkers in this study. 
The fourth chapter will firstly give an overview of what has been discussed in the previous 
chapters. Having given such preliminary considerations, the chapter will offer my personal 
perspective of how the predicament or conflict of rights can be transcended, based on what has 
been explored from the Constitutional Court cases, key thinkers and the constitutional 
guarantees of the “right to freedom of religion”. The chapter will affirm that the influence of 
Christian values that do not threaten or violate other rights and democratic values should be 
                                                          
6 (CCT 60/04) [2005] ZACC 19) / [1 SA 524 [2006]  




permitted to exist in society. In contrast, the chapter will firmly uphold that Christian values 
that impinge upon other constitutionally conceded rights and democratic values should be 
curtailed. This position is in line with John Stuart Mill’s Harm Principle and what I consider 


































CHAPTER ONE  
 
1. A Brief Historical Background (1948-1995), Constitutional Basis for Religious 
Freedom and The State–Religion Relations  
 
1.1 Introduction   
 
Historically, Christian values have played a central role in the enactment of public policy and 
development in the public and political sphere. Between 1948 and 1990, the apartheid years, 
Christian institutions were key players in both supporting and opposing apartheid. On the one 
hand, through pro-apartheid Christian institutions and churches such as the Nederduitse 
Gereformeerde Kerk (NGK), the apartheid system was upheld and safeguarded – indeed, to the 
extent of providing theological or biblical justifications for the apartheid system. On the other 
hand, Christian institutions such as the South African Council of Churches (SACC) became 
essential to the anti-apartheid movement by supporting political organisations or liberation 
movements and organising various politically motivated protests and campaigns against the 
Nationalist government and its political regime.  During the period of transition (1990-1995), 
the role of Christianity shifted, and its influence in the public sphere was based on its advocacy 
of values such as justice, reconciliation and its moral principles. 
In post-1996 South Africa, the position of Christian values and religion in general in the public 
sphere has been somewhat clarified by the Constitution. After 1996 a radical change occurred 
in the South African political context, in that there has been a clearer separation of religion (its 
values) and the state. The enactment of the South African Constitution brought great 
clarification not only to the role of religion in the political sphere and democratisation process 
of South Africa society but also in terms of its relations to the state. Sections 14(1), 15(2), 30(1) 
and 15(3) of the South African Constitution clearly grant religious freedom to all religions in 
South Africa. South Africa also acknowledges the plurality of religious institutions, which 
entails that it does not favour a particular religion or religious group, thereby enabling one to 
call it a “religious-neutral state” rather than a liberal or secular state. In its relations with 
religious institutions, the state does not have a “wall of separation”, but rather collaborates with 
religious institutions on issues of public policy, legislation and democratisation processes. Such 
a non-rigid religion-state relationship allows Christian institutions to participate in the political 




Further, the Constitution gives certain political rights to religious institutions in South Africa, 
although it does not stipulate clearly how far religious values can go in the issues of public 
policy and the process of democratisation. The approval of the South African Charter of 
Religious Rights and Freedoms which to a greater extent clarifies what is meant by “freedom 
of religion” and the role of religious institutions in South Africa is a promising move in solving 
this predicament. South Africa acknowledges a diversity of views among its people and 
upholds the right of all individuals through the principles of equality and freedom. However, 
the state can censor such freedom to make it conform to the rule of law and prevent it from 
infringing upon the rights of others. Certain sections of the Constitution such as the limitation 
clause (Section 36) and the constitutional right against unfair discrimination are vital in creating 
certain boundaries for religious freedom.   
 
1.2 The Influence of Christian Values (1948-1995): A Brief Historical Background   
 
1.2.1 The Political Structure (1948-1990) 
 
The political structure of the period between 1948 and 1990 is characterised as the apartheid 
era. The apartheid political system reached its climax when the National Party in 1948 took 
power from the United Party. Serfontein (1982:7) observes that the National Party’s “triumph 
was based on two crucial issues: apartheid and an emotional appeal to Afrikaner nationalism 
with its implied call to Afrikaner political unity.” The National Party government legalised 
most segregated policies and laws which had been endorsed but loosely implemented by the 
United Party government. The apartheid political structure was based on a number of well-
attested policies and laws which held the system together. By 1960’s, the term ‘apartheid’ had 
acquired a negative connotation and the National Party government tried to discard it though 
its policies and basic structure remained intact. 
According to Denoon (1987:69), the National Party government claimed that apartheid had 
disappeared by 1968, and that only the policy of separate development which advocated the 
creation of “independent homelands” or “national-states” which divided different ethnic groups 
existed. The National Party established ten homelands known as Bantustans as a basis of the 
apartheid system which fostered ethnic groupings. For example, according to the official 
apartheid policy, these Bantustans or national states were “based on the principle of ‘diversity’, 
‘ethnicity’ and the ‘right of self-determination’ of each separate group ‘to control its own 




development fostered the birth of separate homelands and policies concerning influx control, 
pass laws, separate educational institutions, censoring of mixed marriages and so forth. 
 
1.2.2 The Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk and the State (1948-1990) 
 
The State justified the apartheid system using Christian values from the perspective of the 
Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk (NGK), having been a pro-apartheid church institution itself. 
In this case, the influence of certain Christian values through the NGK was central in 
safeguarding the apartheid political system and its principles. Nscokovane (1989:39) highlights 
that “for the Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk, the election victory of the Nationalist Party in 
1948 – meant monitoring of the implementation of the general principles of separation with 
regards to its approach to race relations.” The NGK gave a theological foundation to the 
apartheid political structure by supporting most policies and laws of the apartheid system.  
Soon after the National Party won the 1948 election, Die Kerkbode, the main newspaper of the 
Afrikaner-speaking churches, noted: “as a Church we have always worked purposefully for the 
separation of the races. In this regards apartheid can rightfully be called a church policy” (Villa-
Vicencio 1983:59). Similarly, a document produced in 1948 by the Transvaal Synod of the 
NGK stated that “Scripture posed the unity of humanity. Yet Scripture also recorded and 
presupposed the division of humanity in races and nations as a deed of God” (Kinghorn 
1990:64). In the apartheid era, the aspirations of the Nationalist Party government and the 
religious values of the NGK which safeguarded them biblically could not be separated since 
the link between the two was based on its close relationship to the Afrikaner culture and the 
rise into power of the Afrikaner nation.8 
From 1948, the NGK highly influenced the policy making process of the Nationalist Party 
government with its values. For example, policies such as the 1949 Mixed Marriage Act and 
the 1950 Group Areas Act which the NGK had promulgated under the Federal Mission Council 
of the NGK were immediately transferred into legislation.9 Implicitly, the Christian values of 
the NGK were used as a tool used by the state to justify its political agendas in theological 
                                                          
8 Corrado, E 2013. The Godliness of Apartheid Planning: The legitimizing role of the Dutch Reformed Church. 
[Online webpage]. Available from < https://www.ideals.illinois. edu/bitstream/handle/2142/45241/Corrado 
%20Final%20Capstone.pdf? sequence=3>. [Assessed 2 May 2016]. 
9 Mscokovane, C 1989. Demons of Apartheid: A Moral and Ethical Analysis of the NGK, NP and 




terms. Serfontein (1982:71) highlights the position of the NGK with regards to government 
political structure:  
Virtually blind support of the government in all its policies and actions; blind support for 
apartheid political principles, apart from minor criticisms of details of application; a golden rule 
that nothing must be said or done to “embarrass” or “confront” the government; the 
maintenance of special liaison machinery and committees through which the NGK, without any 
fuss and publicity, could be in contact with the government or government departments.  
Further, the official position of the NGK on race, human relations and other social and political 
issues highly affected the apartheid government – how the NGK interpreted scripture and its 
ecclesiastical formulations became central to the future of the South African political 
dispensation. According to Nscokovane (1989:46), “in 1950 a Dutch Reformed Church 
conference held in Bloemfoentein concluded that the only permanent solution to the racial 
situation in South Africa was ‘total separation’ (i.e. Apartheid) of white and black.” This policy 
was based on the religious idea that since all nations and peoples are equal, they are to be given 
opportunities to prosper in their own nationhood and cultural identities as desired by God.  
Such a theoretical justification by the NGK made the apartheid political structure positive; that 
is, it was perceived as justifiable to let people of different races and ethnicities govern 
themselves and live in separate areas. For instance, while affirming “the theology of humanity 
as equal because of separation,” the NGK 1950 Synod noted that “the Church accepts the 
existence on earth, of nations and races as separate entities through God’s providence” 
(Kinghorn 1990:66). The centrality of NGK’s religious values and ethos in apartheid South 
Africa can also be realized through the politicians of the Nationalist Party who continued to 
refer to Christian principles and ethos, especially given that the “Constitution of the Republic, 
promulgated in 1961, described South Africa as a Christian nation” (Norman 1981:114).  
How did the NGK understand and interpret scripture so that it may promulgate the apartheid 
policies? How did such Christian values influence the public sphere? The understanding of the 
NGK on race was clearly stated in its synodical documents10 adopted by its General Councils 
following the rise to power of the Nationalist Party government in 1948. While the NGK 
supported the need for unity and diversity among human beings, it is “firmly grounded in the 
framework of apartheid and provides a Scriptural basis for apartheid and white domination” 
                                                          
10 The Human Relations in South Africa was issued in 1966 while the South African Scene in the Light of 




(Villa-Vicencio 1983:63).  In this case, the NGK saw its role as making sure that diversity 
through separate development did not promote injustices.  
The NGK seemed to hold a dilemma: “first of all, the DRC [NGK] rejects racial injustice and 
discrimination in principle. Equally clearly, the DRC [NGK] accepts the policy of separate 
development” (Gruchy 1986:73). The contradiction here depended on the fact that the apartheid 
system and the policy of separate development seemed inseparable. How could the NGK deny 
the apartheid policy while at the same time accept the concept of separate development which 
was the basis for racial prejudice, discrimination and social injustices? Although the NGK 
supported the apartheid policy of separate development, it nevertheless emphasised that this 
policy should not be used to marginalize or oppress others such as blacks was this would be 
against God’s will (Kinghorn 1990:62). They hoped for an impossible outcome that the idea of 
separate development would be applied in accordance with the biblical principles of love and 
justice.   
The 1974 General Council of the NGK somewhat shows that its results were politically 
motivated because it clearly forced the NGK to support the division of people which was based 
on the preservation of the Afrikaner culture and identity as is apparent in its separate churches 
– the fulcrum of the apartheid system. One might question whether the policy of separate 
development which the NGK supported in principle was practically applied according to the 
Christian principles of righteousness and justice in an honourable manner without violating 
human dignity. The difficulty arises because the notion of separate development was the basis 
of the apartheid policy – it was awkward for the NGK to uphold separate development and at 
the same time claim to be against racism.  
Towards the end of the 1970s, the NGK began slowly acquiring a revisionist position regarding 
its political stance. A number of NGK theologians and ministers began contradicting the 
Christian values that were being used to justify the apartheid system. For example, according 
to Nscokovane (1989:39), Keet maintained that “common to all arguments, (i.e. biblical 
arguments for racialism in the NGK), is the false assumption that diversity is synonymous with 
separation.” Gradually, many changes within the church doctrine which highlighted a faint but 
growing opposition of the NGK to the Nationalist Party began to be evident. For example, the 
South African History Online (2011) uphold that “in 1986 the church showed its repentance by 
preaching for all members of all racial groups to pray under one umbrella, thus making South 




1.2.3 The South African Council of Churches and the State (1948-1990) 
 
The influence of Christian values in the post-1996 democratic South Africa can be traced from 
the place of religion in the pre-1996 period. In the apartheid era, struggle fighters and liberation 
movements used certain anti-apartheid Christian institutions such as the South African Council 
of Churches (SACC) to oppose the apartheid system. In this case, Christian values played a 
central role in bringing an end to the apartheid political dispensation. As Hay (1998:38) 
articulates, “the rights of blacks were gradually being eroded, and the major Christian churches 
saw their role as trustees over black people”. This led to the creation of the Christian Council 
of South Africa (CCSA) in 1934 which later in 1968 became the South African Council of 
Churches (SACC).11 Some freedom fighters and leaders of liberation movements used the 
SACC and its member churches as a means of exposure by mobilising people in both urban 
and rural areas, especially among black workers. Consequently, some leaders of the liberation 
movements increasingly became either part of anti-apartheid churches or they were directly 
supported by most of these churches.  
The SACC took bold steps in the fight against apartheid and its policies especially from 1948. 
According to de Gruchy (1986:98), soon after the Nationalist Party came into power, Bishop 
Hennemann issued a pastoral letter in 1948 stating: 
 In recent years it (i.e., segregation) has reappeared in the guise and under the name of 
“apartheid”. A beginning has already been made to put into practice this noxious, unchristian 
and destructive policy…To make matters worse, all this is done in the name of Christian 
civilisation. 
As de Gruchy points out, from 1948 the conferences, synods and documents on the racial crisis 
from the SACC upheld its stance against the policy of separate development and many other 
laws linked to it which held apartheid together. The SACC described the apartheid political 
structure as being contrary to Christian principles and values. As Norman (1981:101) 
highlights, “the race issue moved the churches into political opposition to the National Party 
government after 1948.” In the 1960s, member organisations of the SACC continued to 
demonstrate their faith within their own contexts by associating themselves with various 
political and liberation organisations as their contribution in assisting the political struggle.  
                                                          
11 The South African Council of Churches (SACC) is a Christian ecumenical body with various member 




The member churches of the SACC at the Cottesloe Conference unanimously agreed that all 
churches based on the generally agreed Christian principles and values were encouraged to 
fight against racism by rejecting all discrimination which promulgated social injustice and 
oppression through dividing people (Hay 1998:41). This entailed that the churches had a role 
of countering the state where political and social injustices occurred. Alongside liberation 
movements and freedom fighters, the Cottesloe Conference made it clear that the Christian 
faith demands justice and equality before the law, and that the Christian faith renounces the 
discrimination of racial groups on church grounds. This ecumenical council highlighted that 
the task of the church is not only to confront unjustified political structures but also to “help to 
direct national movements towards just and worthy ends” (Villa-Vicencio 1983:150). This was 
followed by an analysis of many government amendments and policies which the Cottesloe 
Conference considered unjust and contrary to the Christian principles and values. 
Although in the 1960s and 1970s the SACC encountered the government’s resentment and 
repressive actions due to its anti-apartheid sentiments arising from Christian values, it 
continued to emerge as a forceful adversary of the government as it increasingly gained a 
political self-identity. For example, in 1968, the SACC issued a bold statement “addressed to 
Christians and in terms of Christian scriptures and Christian tradition denounced apartheid as 
a sin” (Cook 1990:174).  The 1980s marked a period when the SACC moved into the centre of 
the political arena and became highly politicized. According to Hudson-Allison (2000:187), 
“the SACC found itself in an increasingly repressive state apparatus in the 1980s that political 
context, combined with its adherence to an alternative theological tradition, moved the SACC 
to challenge the state.”  
From the perspective of the SACC, apartheid was a heresy12 and inconsistent with Christian 
values and had to be opposed: if necessary through civil defiance. For example, when a new 
Constitution was promulgated in 1983, the SACC took an active stance alongside anti-
apartheid political organisations by taking a front role in criticizing its policies. The SACC 
encouraged its member churches to advise their congregants to refrain from involvement in 
systems, agencies or organisations which justified or promoted the apartheid political structure. 
In 1983, the SACC took a bold step by joining the United Democratic Front (UDF)13, a step 
which brought it closer to tensions with the government (Borer 1999:55).  In 1985, a conference 
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held by the SACC reaffirmed the need for the church to embark on a more forceful resistance 
and campaign of civil disobedience against the political structure. The conference also 
discussed the need for the member churches to call for “disinvestment and similar economic 
pressures” so as to “break the power of an oppressive and unjust system and thereby bring it to 
its knees” (Nash 1985:57). This meant that member churches of the SACC would not invest in 
organisations or institutions which supported apartheid, and that would call for economic 
sanctions on the government.  
In the mid-1980’s, the churches saw a worsening political situation in South Africa instead of 
reform and change. The churches thus began calling for the removal of the apartheid 
government, more or less in line with the political and liberation movements of the mid-1980s. 
As Borer (1998:61) highlights, “the document14 had serious implications for church/state 
relations because it requested Christians to cease praying for the Government and instead to 
pray against it, that is, for its removal.” Towards the end of 1985, leaders of the SACC held a 
consultation meeting in Harare organised by the World Council of Churches to assess the South 
African political situation. At the consultation conference, leaders of trade unions and political 
organisations were also invited and given opportunities to engage in the deliberations and make 
contributions.  
According to ICT News15 (1986:3), the conference affirmed that “apartheid can in no way be 
reformed; we therefore reject categorically all proposals for modification of 
apartheid…churches inside and outside South Africa to support movements working for the 
liberation of their country.” In September 1985, a group of Christian theologians predominantly 
consisting of representatives from the SACC and other organisations16 produced the Kairos 
Document which “provoked varied reactions – from qualified support to outright 
condemnation” (Hay 1998:45). The Kairos Document did not only stir internal and 
international attention, but also encouraged the churches to be more critical and courageous in 
the fight for political liberation – the document called the government a “tyranny” and 
“illegitimate” and declared that its reformation or conversion was impossible (Borer 1998:61). 
The document was followed by strong statements from the SACC in the same year calling for 
the end of the apartheid system.  
                                                          
14 The [unnamed] document was issued by the South African Council of Churches at a conference in 1985.  
15 ICT News, 1986. March, 3. Johannesburg:  ICT Achieves. 
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Since most leaders of liberation movements and other freedom fighters had been imprisoned 
or detained, “the South African Council of Churches took a place of leadership in the resistance, 
causing the security forces to bomb its offices. Black clergy17 became important figures within 
the struggle” (Daye 2004:31). Thus, although the SACC realised the danger and risks involved 
in using church buildings as gatherings places for liberation and resistance movements, it 
nevertheless allowed the move so as to be one with such struggle movements and freedom 
fighters.18 In 1987, another conference under the World Council of Churches was organised in 
Lusaka, Zambia which was attended by the SACC. The conference created an atmosphere 
where the churches and leaders of liberation and resistance movements could dialogue about 
the political crisis in South Africa primarily based on Christian principles and values.  
Apart from declaring the South African apartheid government illegitimate, the SACC through 
the 1987 Lusaka Conference also highlighted its strong support and allegiance to the ANC and 
other liberation movements and freedom fighters. This means that the member churches of the 
SACC in South Africa opted to join forces with resistance movements, rather than only 
allowing them to use church facilities for politically motivated gatherings where possible.  
Although the 1987 Lusaka Conference did not support the use of violence as the quoted 
statement indicates, it desperately reaffirmed its full backing and support for the urgent need 
of political liberation of South Africa. After the Conference, the SACC undertook a central role 
in the political struggle and began to critically analyse the legitimacy of the state and its 
apartheid policies. It articulated its disapproval of certain policies such as the Education Act, 
Group Areas Act and the Population Registration Act. At this point, the SACC had acquired a 
central position in the political struggle which made it increasingly politicised and its values 
politically influential in opposing apartheid which was largely due to the churches’ 
involvement in liberation and resistance movements. 
In 1988, when the Nationalist Party government announced the banning of the UDF and other 
anti-apartheid organisations, the church felt the urgency of confronting the political situation 
(Gruchy 1986:125). Soon after the bannings, the SACC organised a meeting to discuss the 
matter. According to Borer (1998:71), this meeting released a firm statement by declaring that: 
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The ban on the activities of the 17 organisations is a blow directed at the heart of the Church’s 
mission in South Africa, because the banned organisations are organisations for our people, the 
majority of which belong to our church.  
As Chikane (1988:2-4) puts it, the SACC concluded that “if the State wants to act against the 
Church of God in this country for proclaiming the Gospel, then so be it”. Furthermore, the 
SACC created the ‘Standing for the Truth Campaign’ with the aim of persuading and forcing 
the state to abolish certain apartheid policies and enter into negotiations which would lead to 
the creation of a democratic Constitution and nation (Chikane 1988:2-4). Thus, anti-apartheid 
churches used various means such as sermons, church news networks, pastoral letters and so 
forth to oppose apartheid policies. 1989 was marked by the churches becoming more 
vigorously engaged in nonviolent resistance against apartheid. For example, the SACC was an 
active actor of “the Mass Democratic Movement’s Defiance Campaign on August 2, 1989, a 
struggle directed at the upcoming September elections for the tricameral parliament” (Hudson-
Allison 2000:200). This action united the anti-apartheid churches with secular liberation 
movements and organisations in the call for political freedom.  
According to the Institute of Contextual Theology (1989:10), in reaffirming its involvement in 
the Defiance Campaign, the SACC stated that “the role of the Church is to create peace. But 
on the road to negotiation, reconciliation and peace, it will be necessary to confront, pressurise 
and defy”. In September the same year, SACC leaders organised pacifist demonstrations which 
were also accompanied by leaders of various liberation movements and opposition parties. A 
few months after campaigns in the form of marches and protests in which Christian institutions 
affiliated to the SACC were fully involved, the many bannings were cancelled and most 
political activists including Nelson Mandela were released from prison.  
 
1.2.4 The Influence of Christian Values in the Transition Period (1990 – 1995) 
 
By 1990, the churches began moving away from their 1980s political standing when they 
perpetuated civil disobedience and identified themselves with liberation movements and 
freedom fighters. The period between 1990 and 1995 was a complex time of revision and 
transition in terms of the role of Christian values in the changing political scene. Hay (1998:47) 
highlights that:  
With the unbanning of the liberation movements…the return of leaders from exile, the churches 
stepped back from the symbolic leadership positions they had assumed under the period of 




The position of the church prior to 1990 had been affected by the political crisis which had 
brought the church and its values to the centre stage of the political arena. The place of the 
SACC in the political realm during the period of transition was determined by both the reforms 
within the Christian contexts and the changing political milieu. By 1990, the NGK had 
reconciled with the SACC in highlighting that the apartheid was contrary to Christian values. 
As the Southern African Catholic Bishops' Conference (2016) clearly highlights, “since 
February 1990, priority is given to conflict resolution, education, democracy and 
development.” Thus, the year 1990 was marked by the emergence of violence and negotiations, 
a context where the church played a role of mediation in the changing political dispensation.  
Borer (1998:173) highlights that leaders of the SACC “expended their full energy on trying to 
keep political opponents talking with each other, while at the same time desperately trying to 
stem the rising tide of violence”. This means that Christian institutions such as the SACC had 
to acquire a new identity as mediators of political negotiation and deliberations. Although the 
SACC would increasingly perceive itself as a facilitator of the political negotiations, by 1990, 
it was also cautious of the negotiations which would soon be underway. The SACC vowed to 
support and spearhead negotiations which would lead to Christian values such as justice and 
equality for all.  
In the changing political context, Christian institutions such as the SACC saw their role as not 
only educating the people about the changes in the political sphere, but also as being supportive 
and mediators of ongoing political negotiations. In 1991, the SACC also participated in 
campaigns regarding the unbanning of various apartheid laws and policies and the call for the 
return of political expatriates (Macozoma 1990:10). Subsequently, both the SACC and SACBC 
became part of the newly created National Coordination Committee for Repatriation (NCCR), 
whose affiliation involved political organisations such as AZAPO, ANC and PAC. According 
to Borer (1998:177), “the NCCR marked the first time that these church organisations worked 
directly with liberation movements…close to 6, 000 exiles were assisted in their return by the 
NCCR.” 
Although negotiations had been initiated in 1990, by 1991 they were disturbed by 
disagreements and violent confrontations between the government and liberation movements. 
In such a situation, the SACC spearheaded meetings and negotiations between the ANC and 




PAC.19 In the same year, leaders of the SACC met with President de Klerk to submit a 
statement consisting of measures that would help facilitate dialogue and curb the escalating 
political unrest. Borer (1998:259) quotes Lamola who highlights that some of the proposals 
that were presented include “a speedy installation of an interim government; joint control of 
security forces, the apprehension by the police of all perpetrators of violence, an international 
monitoring force, disclosure of all past covert operations.” 
In 1992, the SACC continued to play a mediation role in maintaining both secretive and public 
discussions and negotiations mainly between the government and other political organisations 
or movements. Following escalating protests and violent attacks, the government’s lack of 
interest in peaceful negotiations, and the unsuccessful attempts of Christian institutions to 
lessen violence, the SACC affirmed its support for mass protests20. At the same time, the SACC 
tried to seek outside help. Chikane (1993:8) affirms: 
In 1992, the SACC and SACBC worked with their international partners, the World Council of 
Churches and the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, to bring in international violence 
monitors through EMPSA’s international coordinating office at the WCC in Geneva.  
By 1992, leaders of the SACC realised that peaceful confrontations with the government were 
by large ineffective and unproductive. According to the SACC National Conference Resolution 
Report (1992), the May 1992 Church Leaders Meeting in a document entitled “A Call to Build 
a New South Africa” stated that the “minority and illegitimate government had a premeditated 
strategy of undermining the influence and effectiveness of the liberation movement and their 
leadership by orchestrating violence”21. As the SACC entered 1993, it continued to play its 
mediation role while being aware of the changes and reforms occurring within political and 
religious contexts. As the process of democratisation was broadening and negotiations were 
becoming more forceful, the 1993 SACC National Conference affirmed the new role of 
Christian values or ethos in the political world.  
 
 
                                                          
19 Chikane, F 1992. Report of the General Secretary to the National Executive Committee, February. 
Johannesburg: SACC Archives. pp2 
20 The SACC stated that “we believe that mass action has been necessitated by the deadlock occasioned by the 
Government’s unwillingness to accept genuine democratic processes to take their course”. Cf., SACC National 
Conference Resolutions, 1992. Resolution 2. Johannesburg: SACC Achieves.  
21 A Call to Build a New South Africa document also stated that the government “therefore manipulates the 
political playing field by creating an adverse climate for the holding of free and fair elections which are to lead 




1.3 The Constitution: Basis for the Influence of Christian Values 
 
1.3.1 Constitutional Guarantees of Religious Rights  
 
The 1996 South African Constitution explicitly upholds various fundamental human rights. As 
the cornerstone of democracy, the Constitution secures fundamental rights which demonstrate 
the state’s neutrality to individuals and institutions, both religious and non-religious. The 
explicit articulations of various rights and freedoms are contained in the Bill of Rights. Section 
7(1) of the Constitution defines the Bill of Rights as “a cornerstone of democracy in South 
Africa” since “it enshrines the rights of all people in our country and affirms the democratic 
values of human dignity, equality and freedom.” Section 7(2) of the Constitution mandates the 
state to “respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights.” From these general 
stipulations, the Constitution, through the Bill of Rights, highlights many essential human 
rights.  
Section 9(1) of the Constitution states that “everyone is equal before the law and has the right 
to equal protection and benefit of the law”. This is further clarified by Section 9(3) which 
prohibits unfair discrimination based on grounds such as religion. From this perspective, the 
primary consideration in understanding the basis for the influence of Christian values in post-
apartheid South Africa can be traced to the respect for religious freedom as affirmed in the 
1996 South African Constitution. Du Plessis (2010:17) rightly argues: 
The South African law on state and religion is embodied in the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996, as prime source; in the common law knowable from (and developed 
through) case law; in legislation, and in administrative/policy directives.  
Although the quote highlights the centrality of the Constitution in regulating the guarantees of 
religious rights and those of the state, it also underlines the necessity for ongoing development 
of the law of the land through legislation due to the various complex particular cases which 
might arise. As Oliver (2002:531) affirms, although the context and content of the rights related 
to religion are “recognised by the Constitutional Court”, they must nevertheless “be understood 
against the backdrop of the constitutional negotiation process”. From this perspective, the 
influence of Christian values in the public sphere does not only rely on the constitutional 
provisions but also on the statutory rulings and interpretations of the Constitutional Court 
which become central to the relations between the state and religious institutions.  
Although the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court is vital in the highlighted process, the 




guarantees of the rights related to religion through which some institutions seek to influence 
the state with certain Christian values. The South African Constitution highlights a number of 
rights related to religion. Section 14 (1) firmly states that “every person shall have the right to 
freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion” (Rautenbach 1995:108). Section 
14(1) of the South African Constitution clearly positions religion on an equal footing with other 
rights such as freedom of thought and opinion. This is in line with the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights which puts together and treats equally the freedom and rights of religion, 
conscience and thought. As cited by Koshy (1992:22), the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights states: 
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; this right includes 
freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in a community with 
others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship 
and observance. 
From this perspective, it is apparent that the Constitution upholds religious liberty.  The 
highlighted constitutional ‘right to freedom of religion’ is clarified by other sections of the Bill 
of Rights. In this case, Sections 15(2), 30(1) and 15(3) can be considered. Firstly, Section 15(2) 
allows for the free exercise of religious observances at “state or state-aided schools”22 provided 
that such adherences conform to the stipulations made by the relevant public authorities, that 
they are exercised “on an equitable basis”23 and that “attendance at them is free and 
voluntary”24. From this outlook, it is apparent that Christian institutions may advocate Christian 
values in educational settings as long as the three constitutional provisions are met. For 
example, Section 15(2) grants a right to schools run by Christian institutions to impart certain 
Christian values and a Christian ethos.  
Secondly, Section 15(3)(a) recognises marriages conducted under a system of personal or 
religious law or “adhered by persons professing a particular religion”. Under this provision, 
marriages conducted by Christian institutions are recognised by the state. With regards to 
religious practices, Section 31(1) guarantees Christian institutions the right to freely practice 
and maintain their beliefs or convictions. Section 31(1) explicitly states:  
Persons belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic community may not be denied the right, 
with other members of that community - (a) to enjoy their culture, practise their religion and 
                                                          
22 Section 15(2)(a) of the South African Constitution.   
23 Ibid., 15(2)(b).  




use their language; and (b) to form, join and maintain cultural, religious and linguistic 
associations and other organs of civil society. 
Thirdly, the rights relating to religion in South Africa may also be traced to the Constitution’s 
prohibition of unfair discrimination and segregation based on religious belief and conviction. 
Section 9(1) of the South African Constitution on “Equality” affirms that “everyone is equal 
before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law” and Section 9(3) 
elucidates this regulation or legislation by affirming that “the state may not unfairly 
discriminate directly or indirectly anyone on one or more grounds, including …religion, 
conscience, belief”. Although this point reaffirms religious freedom which is clarified in 
Section 14(1), it also upholds the fact that religion is seen as other organisations in the political 
or public sphere and may not be segregated or marginalised by the state.  
Finally, rights related to religion can also be traced through the political rights highlighted in 
the South African Constitution which generally affirm that all citizens, groups or religious 
institutions are free to participate in the public and political sphere. Section 19(1) on ‘Political 
Rights’ which highlights that all citizens have freedom to political participation and choice 
gives a hint on the position of Christian values in the democratic South Africa. Section 19(1) 
of the South African Constitution stipulates:  
(1) Every citizen is free to make political choices, which includes the right to – (a) form a 
political party; (b) participate in the activities of, or recruit members for, a political party; and 
(c) campaign for a political party or cause.  
The fact that the Constitution grants such political rights to every citizen implies that Christian 
institutions may participate in the political activities of the state and even challenge the state 
according to the guiding principles of the Constitution. Clearly, Section 19 of the South African 
Constitution allows for all citizens to participate and exercise their political rights without being 
discriminated against or ignored.  In this case, Christian institutions can form a political party 
and support particular political organisations based on Christian values. Concerning the 
interaction between the state and religious institutions, Dlamini (2003:160) argues that 
although the South African Constitution portrays the state as democratic, it also permits the 
“free interaction between the state and religious organisations” in political and other public 
matters.  
The rights and freedoms related to religion do not only uphold general respect for certain 
Christian values in the public sphere, they also have to be acknowledged as relevant and 




participate in the public or political sphere without marginalising the influence of religious 
values on the basis of religion. Although the Constitution highlights the various freedoms and 
rights related to religion or religious institutions, it does not clarify the boundaries or 
parameters of the influence of Christian values in the public sphere. The South African Charter 
of Religious Rights and Freedoms (SACRRF) is an attempt to offer this clarity.  
 
1.3.2 South African Charter of Religious Rights and Freedoms (SACRRF) 
 
It is important to reiterate that Sections 14(1), 15(2), 30(1) and 15(3) of the Bill of Rights make 
provision for religious freedom although they do not clarify what this freedom exactly entails. 
As Coertzen (2008:365) highlights, “the Constitution does not clearly identify in detail what 
freedom of religion implies. It is the task of religions in South Africa to identify the religious 
rights that they claim”. From this perspective, religious institutions through a Charter of Rights 
known as the South African Charter of Religious Rights and Freedoms (SACRRF) seek to 
clarify not only the identity but also the influence of religious values in the new post-1996 
political dispensation, based on the rights stipulated by the Constitution.   
To clarify what religious freedom means and the role of religion and its values in the democratic 
South Africa, the SACRRF was drawn up after the enactment and approval of the South 
African Constitution in 1996. Although the SACRRF has not yet been approved, religious 
institutions in South Africa hope that this Charter will be approved by Parliament.  The drawing 
up of this Charter is in line with Section 234 of the South African Constitution on the ‘Charters 
of Rights’ which states that “in order to deepen the culture of democracy established by the 
Constitution, Parliament may adopt Charters of Rights consistent with the provisions of the 
Constitution”.  
The SACRRF is a legal Charter or document enacted by South African religious institutions 
and organisations to try and define rights and freedom of various religions and faith-based 
organisations in South Africa. It highlights in a more elaborate way the relationship between 
the state and religion, and the responsibilities that religious institutions have in the general 
public. Since the South African Constitution does not say much about religion (such as 
Christian institutions) and its position or role in South Africa especially in the public arena, the 
Charter has been used to clarify this predicament. As Coertzen (2014:129) puts it, “the Charter 
is also a very useful tool for religions to determine their own identity in terms of the rights and 




The SACRRF attempts to define the meaning of “freedom of religion” as expressed in the 
South African Constitution, and some of the definite responsibilities and rights linked to such 
freedom. The Charter clearly emphasises the separation between the state and religion, and the 
autonomy or self-determination of religious values which the latter ought to enjoy without the 
unnecessary intervention of the state especially in terms of the judicial system. For example, 
Section 9(2) of the South African Charter of Religious Rights and Freedoms states that “every 
religious institution is recognised and protected as an institution that has authority over its own 
affairs” and Section 9(4) states that “the confidentiality of the internal affairs and 
communications of a religious institution must be respected”.  
The assertion clearly indicates that religion is somehow independent in all its dealings, and that 
the state cannot unnecessarily intervene to silence it or regulate its general participation by 
unfairly limiting the influence of its values. As van der Vyver (2012:151) observes, the South 
African Charter of Religious Rights and Freedoms “guarantees the right to self-determination 
of religious communities”. The Charter also deals with the rights which religion in general is 
entitled to possess in the political and public sphere. For example, Section 6 states that “every 
person has the right to freedom of expression in respect of religion” which is clarified by 
Section 6(1) which affirms that “every person has the right (a) to make public statements and 
participate in public debate on religious grounds”. The Charter anticipates that the “freedom of 
religion” advocated in the South African Constitution also entails that religious institutions can 
actually participate in the political sphere without being unfairly ridiculed or marginalised.  
Therefore, the “right to freedom of expression in respect of religion” affirmed by the Charter 
entail that religious institutions can actively participate and engage in the political arena as a 
separate institution. In 2012, The Council for the Protection and Promotion of Religious Rights 
and Freedoms in South Africa submitted the SACRRF to the Commission for the Promotion 
and Protection of the Rights of Culture, Religious and Linguistic Freedoms for official 
recognition and passing in Parliament.  The passing into law of the SACRRF means that 
freedom of religion and the rights entailed therein will be protected by the legal system of South 
Africa. Should the Charter be approved by Parliament, the place of religion in South Africa 
will be clearer than it is in the Constitution at present, though the consequences of its 






1.3.3 The Meaning of Religious Freedom  
 
Despite the explicit Constitutional stipulations of religious rights in Sections 14(1), 15(2), 
15(3), and 30(1), a question arises. What does freedom of religion really mean? An attempt to 
define religious freedom requires first and foremost defining religious autonomy. This is 
because the right to freedom of religion is primarily based on the principle of religious 
autonomy. For Van der Schyff (2003:512), “freedom of religious autonomy refers to aspects 
of the relationship between the state and religion, as well as other institutional aspects of 
religion, such as the regulation of own affairs and doctrine, religious dignity”. Religious 
autonomy goes as far as giving religious institutions the internal aspect of religious liberty. 
This entails the right to regulate their beliefs and doctrines which are within the spectrum or 
domain of a particular religious organisation or institution. 
From the highlighted perspective and based on Section 31(1) of the Bill of Rights, Christian 
institutions in South Africa have the right to regulation of beliefs and doctrines in their own 
circles. Further, religious autonomy in this case suggests that individuals or groups are given 
the opportunity and the means to choose freely the belief or worldview to which they wish to 
adhere and the space in which to apply or practice it. In line with this, Kumalo (2013:636) 
points out that South Africa “observes the fact that its citizens are religious and allows them to 
practice their religions freely in public spaces without placing any limitations or biases on any 
particular religion”.  
Reading the Constitution from the affirmed perspective with regard to religious autonomy does 
not give religious institutions the right to influence the general public with their values. Such a 
difficulty highlights the need to define religious freedom beyond the notion of religious 
autonomy. Thinkers such as Meyerson and Coertzen define religious freedom in terms of the 
Bill of Rights25. Coertzen (2011:11) follows Blei in arguing that “religious freedom means 
more than just having a religion and upholding inner convictions and feelings” because it 
“includes the right of everybody to express his or her religion and faith in worship, teaching, 
practice, and maintenance.” Christian institutions are free to practice their religious values in 
both private and public spheres.  
Further, Christian institutions can influence society with religious values by either engaging 
actively with issues of public policy or enforcing their values within their religious institutions. 
                                                          





Based on the Constitutional right to freedom of religion, the state grants Christian values 
protection given to other non-religious rights. Wherever the question of “the right to freedom 
of religion” arises, one may question how far the influence of certain Christian values can 
penetrate the public sphere based on the concept of religious freedom. This affirms the 
relevance of the Constitutional limitations for religious freedom.  
 
1.3.4 Constitutional Limitations for Religious Freedom or Rights  
 
The Constitutional stipulations concerning various fundamental human rights which includes 
those relating to religion can be examined and reinterpreted in accordance with the limitation 
clause (Section 36) which stipulates:  
The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to 
the extent that the limitation is reasonably and justifiable in an open and democratic society 
based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors…  
According to the limitation clause, the relevant factors include “the nature of the right” and the 
significance of the purpose of the constraint together with its nature, extent and the link between 
such a constraint or limitation and its purpose.26 The practical application of the limitation 
clause has been at the centre of some Constitutional Court has had cases where the Court had 
to decide how far certain Christian values can go in the public sphere. With regard to the right 
of freedom of religion and the practice of religious values, Section 31(2) states that such rights 
“…may not be exercised in a manner inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights.” 
From the perspective of the limitation clause and Section 31(2) of the Constitution, it seems 
apparent that religious freedom is not absolute but that it has to be exercised in accordance with 
other Constitutional rights and freedoms.  
With regard to the place of religion, and particularly that of Christian institutions in South 
Africa’s public sphere, the Constitution does not clarify how far Christian values may enter the 
political arena. The fact that religious freedom in the Constitution of South Africa is treated as 
one of many rights means that it is not absolute in the public sphere. As Peron (2003:3) puts it, 
South Africa provides “a political ideal where individuals are free to pursue their own goals in 
their own ways provided they do not infringe on the equal liberty of others”. As a democratic 
state, South Africa reaffirms a framework where a diversity of ideas and convictions flourish. 
Amidst such diversity, the limitation clause provides a form of control or balance of various 
                                                          




fundamental rights. Therefore, the South African Constitution presents the “government as the 
guardian and provider of general welfare empowered to act on its own discretionary authority 
in the pursuit of the common good” (Gray 1995:77).  
Accordingly, internal religious liberty involves the freedom to practice and regulate religious 
beliefs and convictions as long as they do not conflict with the general law or infringe on the 
rights of others. For that reason, the participation of Christian institutions in the public sphere 
through the influence of its values has to be perceived as being in line with the Constitution, so 
that its contribution lies within the rule of law. As Peron (2003:3) puts it, a democratic state 
provides “a political ideal where individuals are free to pursue their own goals in their own 
ways provided they do not infringe on the equal liberty of others.” Such an understanding of 
freedom of religion is often understood in the context of “freedom under the law” so that 
“individuals should enjoy the maximum possible liberty consistent with a like liberty for all” 
(Heywood 2007:46). 
 
1.4 Religion and the State  
 
1.4.1 The State and Christian Institutions: Relations   
 
The fact that the separation between state and religion in South Africa can be generally 
described as flexible is appealing since this “doctrine of the separation of church and state has 
undergone, and is undergoing, constant modification” (Kasomo & Napoo 2013:15). Thus, it is 
somewhat challenging to affirm the definite relationship between the state and the Christian 
institutions in South Africa, a relationship which might somehow highlight the boundaries 
regarding the influence of certain Christian values in the public sphere. In that way, van Wyk 
(2005:670) observes that: 
the relationship between the church and the state cannot be determined and formulated only 
once and conclusively. This relationship varies and changes in tandem with social and political 
changes. 
The position of van Wyk reaffirms the complexity of the state-religion relationship in South 
Africa post-1996. Given that the separation between religious institutions and the state is not 
straightforward in post-1996 South Africa, determining how far Christian values can influence 
the public sphere is equally not clear. As Coertzen (2008:262) stresses, although “in 1994 
(1996) South Africa got a Constitution which guaranteed freedom of religion”, it “does not 




Constitution which has already been clearly highlighted provokes the question of the separation 
of Christian institutions and State which is not clearly elaborated from a constitutional 
perspective. Following Kumalo (2013:633), a closer look at the Constitution and the rulings of 
the Constitutional Court indicates that the South African context does not follow a strict 
separation between religion and the state although “the two institutions (church and 
government)” have “to maintain their relative autonomies from each other”.  
Similarly, the Constitution does not have an established religion whereby one religion is 
officially sanctioned. Since South Africa has no state or established religion or religious sect, 
the situation where Christian institutions or any other religious institution controls the state by 
regulating certain laws and government policies is avoided. Similarly, the case where the state 
dictates religious institutions by controlling religious practices, monitoring the contribution of 
religious institutions in the public arena and repressing its dealings and internal communication 
is not Constitutionally tolerated. According to the Catholic Parliamentary Liaison Office 
(2005:4), South Africa in the post-apartheid era has adopted the model of “separation with 
interaction” which entails that “there is no wall of separation between religious groups and the 
state; interaction is encouraged, as is the input of religious groups into the formation of public 
policy”. This openness is the basis of the religion-state relations and a reaffirmation of a 
possible influence of Christian values in the public sphere.  
Furthermore, although the Constitution makes it clear that South Africa is a democratic state, 
it does consider and respect freedom of expression from religious groups whose inputs cannot 
be ignored. Thus, Piper (2009:68) sees the South African situation as an “institutional context 
that accommodates organised religion alongside the state” which gives room for the 
“constructive role that organised religion or faith-based organisations can play in liberal and 
democratic contexts”. The flexible collaboration which defines the relationship between the 
South African state and certain Christian institutions27 is apparent. 
Tayob (2015:126) plausibly contends “that South Africans should stay clear of both a religious 
state and a highly secularized state that keeps religion and state in strict separation”. There is 
no “wall of separation” between the state and religion in South Africa because Christian 
institutions are allowed to both practice their beliefs and regulate religious matters and also to 
participate in the public arena where religious input is acknowledged in the formation of the 
                                                          
27 The state and religious institutions such as South African Council of Churches in South Africa often 




legal policies and laws28. The separation of religion, and particularly Christian institutions, and 
state in South Africa also means that although Christianity is officially separated from the state 
and its dealings or regulations of the public law or policy, certain Christian values have an 
influence in the law-making processes or in the application of such laws. This has been the case 
in South Africa where Christian institutions such as the SACC have been able to engage with 
the state, thereby influencing the state and society with religious values. In line with this, the 
Catholic Parliamentary Liaison Office (2005:8) highlights: 
The writers of the 1996 Constitution…did not want to impede the ability of religion to influence 
the public sphere in a positive way. The model of separation (to break up the unhealthy alliance 
between one form of religion and the state) with interaction (to allow religious groups to 
participate in the reconstruction process) is thus well-suited to the South African context.  
Therefore, with reference to Sections 8 and 19, the South African Constitution shows that 
religion, and in this case, Christian institutions have a special role to play in the public sphere 
through their values. The role of Christian values in the public sphere is based on the fact that 
although Christian institutions are separated from the state, they are nevertheless free to 
participate and make inputs in the public sphere. This conforms to Kuperus (2011:284) who 
argues that “South Africa churches today interact with a democratic state that respects religious 
pluralism rather than an authoritarian state that upholds Christian nationalism”. 
  
1.4.2 State Liberality and Pluralism of Religions in South Africa 
  
Being a democratic state, South Africa holds certain liberal values or principles. The word 
liberal comes from the Latin word liber which literally means ‘to be free’.  Liberalism is a 
political worldview based on the idea of maximizing freedom for individuals, groups or 
institutions (Heywood 2007:46). From this perspective, the sort of freedom entailed by the 
concept of liberalism affirms the idea that individuals (or groups) are given the opportunity and 
the means to choose freely the belief, worldview or conviction to which they wish to adhere 
and the space in which to apply or practice it. South Africa as a liberal state reaffirms a 
framework where a diversity of ideas and convictions flourishes. The notion of a liberal or 
democratic state presents the “government as the guardian and provider of general welfare 
empowered to act on its own discretionary authority in the pursuit of the common good” (Gray 
1995:77).  
                                                          




The fact that the South African Constitution protects the rights of all citizens with respect to 
diversity in cultures, opinions, religions, beliefs, values and practices is worth emphasising. 
According to Section 2 of the South African Constitution, the “Constitution is the supreme law 
of the Republic; law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by 
it must be fulfilled”.  In line with Section 2, van der Vyver (2008:345) argues:  
The South African Constitution indeed instructs the state to ‘respect, protect and fulfil the rights 
in the Bill of Rights’, including the provisions proclaiming ‘freedom of conscience, religion, 
thought, belief and opinion’.  
The South African Constitution also affirms the principle of equality which further puts certain 
Christian values on par with other civil organisations in the political arena. Equality demands 
that the state treats all worldviews justly and with fairness. For example, the fact that people 
might have different cultural, traditional, secular or religious opinions in South Africa does not 
give the state permission to treat a particular group or worldview unfairly or differently. This 
adheres to the idea of equal freedom or liberty which seems to balance the values of equality 
and diversity whilst safeguarding the autonomy of Christian institutions and their values in 
South Africa’s public sphere.  
Essential values such as freedom and equality which the South African Constitution upholds 
form principles of a neutral state. According to Jones (1989:9), “a neutral state is one that deals 
impartially with its citizens and which remains neutral on the issue of what sort of lives they 
should lead”. From the perspective of state neutrality, Smith (2000:61) recognizes ‘religious 
equality’ and ‘religious pluralism’ as the two principles which grounds religious freedom in 
the Constitution. Under the current standing of the South African Constitution, neutrality 
among different worldviews both religious and non-religious entails the equality of the 
influence of such views in the public sphere. Van Wyk (2005:674) asserts that “in our 
pluralistic society the authorities can no longer be expected to transform into legislation the 
likes and dislikes of a particular religion”.   
Due to the central place of religion generally in South Africa, some thinkers argue that South 
Africa can best be described as a religiously neutral state as evidenced by the Constitutional 
religious provisions. For example, Kumalo (2013:636) affirms that “South Africa is not just a 
religious country simply because the majority of the people allege to belong to some religion, 
but even the Constitution of the country declares it to be a religiously neutral state”. This means 




state relation29. The concept of pluralism of religions and its relation to the state is well-
captured by Piper (2007:71) when he writes:  
Today the Constitution affirms all religions and not only one; the state does not promote 
religious purposes through law and policy; it does not restrict freedom of religion; and no 
religious body has any special constitutional standing.  
In line with Piper, van der Vyver (2007:108) argues that “South Africa is not a secular state 
but can perhaps best be depicted as a religiously neutral state. That is to say, religion is not a 
political taboo”. As a religiously neutral state, South Africa does not practice bias or 
discrimination by preferring one religion over the other, but all religions are respected and 
given equal voice in the public sphere30. From this perspective, the state does not also unfairly 
discriminate against the influence or role of religious values in both private and public spheres.  
 
 
1.5 Conclusion  
 
This chapter served as the background to the study. The chapter firstly gave a brief overview 
of the role of two Christian institutions or church organisations between 1948 and 1995. This 
served as a historical background to the role of Christian values in post-1996 South Africa. The 
chapter maintained that while the NGK justified the apartheid political dispensation 
theologically based on Christian values, other Christian institutions such as the SACC affirmed 
otherwise. The chapter also explored in detail the Constitutional basis for religious freedom 
and other related rights. The Constitutional stipulations of the “right to freedom of religion” 
and other provisions concerning this right are the basis for the influence of Christian values in 
society. From the above perspective, the chapter affirmed that religious freedom is guaranteed 
by the Constitution just as any other rights and freedoms in the post-1996 democratic context 
– legally both the freedom to hold or adopt a particular belief and to practice such a belief is 
protected. The chapter maintained that the Constitution does not articulate the boundaries of 
the exercise of religious freedom in society. In this regard, the approval of the South African 
Charter of Religious Rights and Freedoms (SACRRF) will be helpful in clarifying this right. 
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However, the limitation clause (Section 36) and Section 31(2) of the Constitution is useful in 
discussing the meaning of freedom of religion constitutionally.   
The final part of this chapter dealt with the relations between the state and Christian institutions 
in the post-1996 context. The fact that the South African model does not favour a “wall of 
separation” in state-religion relations was affirmed as being in line with the Constitution. By 
implication, this means that although Christian institutions function autonomously from the 
state and the state’s dealings, their influence in society cannot be ignored or underrated. 
However, since South Africa is a democratic state, the chapter maintained that it upholds the 
principles of state liberality and pluralism. This necessitates that through democratic values 
such as equality and freedom, the state does not only respect all worldviews, but also that all 
worldviews whether religious or not are considered with equal significance as long as they 
conform to the Constitutional spirit. The chapter demonstrated that the Constitutional basis for 
religious freedom, the state–religion relations and the pre-1996 context are the background to 

















CHAPTER 2  
2. The Constitutional Court’s Reading of Religious Freedom: Three Case Studies 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
The previous chapter explained that the Constitution is the highest source of law which 
stipulates fundamental human rights in South Africa. Seemingly, the influence of certain 
Christian values in the public sphere is based on the Constitutional provisions of religious 
freedom. For example, the Constitution clearly affirms that “every person shall have the right 
to freedom of …religion”31 and that “persons belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic 
community may not be denied the right… to enjoy their culture, practise their religion”32. 
Although this seems to emphasise religious autonomy, what remains questionable is how far 
Christian institutions can go in terms of influencing the public sphere with its values.  
In some cases, the advocacy of certain Christian values in the public sphere by some Christian 
institutions has led to a clash of rights. The clash has been between the rights relating to religion 
and other fundamental rights which are violated due to the influence of Christian values. How 
can the Constitutional Court reconcile the Constitutional rights and freedom of religious belief 
and autonomy through which some Christian institutions seeks to influence society and the 
state with its values on the one hand and the Constitutional rights which seem to be violated or 
infringed in the process of advocating such Christian ethos or values on the other hand?  This 
chapter explains the dilemma caused by the influence of Christian values in South Africa post-
1996. Given that the Constitution gives a firm but unclear delineation of religious freedom and 
what this entails, the Constitutional Court through a number of cases has over the years 
attempted to provide an interpretation of Constitutional provisions relating to freedom of 
religion.  
In Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education [2000 (4) SA 757 (CC)], the Court 
decided against the Christian Education of South Africa’s appeal to be allowed to practice 
corporal punishment in some Christian schools. The Constitutional Court ruled against the 
claim that Christian faith demands that parents discipline their children through corporal 
punishment, and that based on the Constitutional stipulations on religious freedom, Christian 
institutions have a right to employ Christian values which include the use of corporal 
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punishment in its schools. Similarly, in Minister of Home Affairs and Another v Fourie and 
Another, the Court ruled against religious claims opposing same-sex marriages although it 
maintained that religious institutions are not obliged to recognise same-sex unions or officiate 
such same-sex marriage ceremonies. In both cases, the Constitutional Court observed that 
Christian values are vital to society.  
In Ecclesia de Lange v Methodist Church of South Africa, the Constitutional Court hesitated 
from interfering with the autonomy and self-governing of religious institutions. Ms De Lange, 
who had been suspended from her ministerial duties in the Methodist Church of South Africa 
after announcing her intention of marrying her same-sex partner was referred back to the 
arbitration process of her church. Although the Constitutional Court hesitated to make a 
judgement in this case which had to do with religious convictions and doctrines, it maintained 
that if the applicant had followed the process from the start and advanced the argument of 
unfair discrimination, the judgement would have had a different outcome.  
 
2.2 Understanding the Problem: The Influence of Certain Christian Values  
 
Certain Christian institutions attempt to influence society and the state with their values or 
ethos. In this process, since religious values conflict with other equally protected rights and 
values, Christian institutions retaliate against the law of general application. For Lenta 
(2009:27), this has been partly because “the values animating liberal constitutionalism collide 
at times with the beliefs of members of religious groups”. In South Africa, this has been clear 
in a number of cases where Christianity has directly or indirectly opposed or influenced the 
processes leading to the legalisation of certain generally applying laws and policies. In other 
cases, certain Christian institutions have challenged laws and policies which they deem 
contrary Christian values and convictions.  
The point that the influence of Christian values in society is based on the “constitutional 
guarantees of religious rights” needs emphasis (du Plessis 2010:18)33. Explicitly, the 
Constitution guarantees religious institutions the freedom to regulate their beliefs and opinions 
and by extension, to maintain and practice religious stipulations and observances34. Based on 
such rights, the attempt to influence the state and society has been in line with the religious 
claims of autonomy, sovereignty and freedom of religion enjoyed by religious institutions 
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based on the Constitutional requisites. For example, the principle of autonomy and self-
determination has been one of the most vital arguments used by certain Christian institutions 
to influence the public sphere with their values in the post-1996 democratic South Africa.  
The claim that “religious believers in South Africa have made public their opposition to the 
laws and legal decisions that contravene their beliefs” requires reaffirmation (Lenta 2009:27). 
The attempts of Christian institutions to influence the state and policy making processes 
through their values, suggests a conflict of rights. Realising this conflict, Judge Westhuizen in 
the case dubbed De Lange v Presiding Bishop of the Methodist Church of Southern Africa 
generally remarked:  
Rights sometimes compete, as we know. The right to equality, for instance, often competes 
with the rights to free expression, dignity, privacy and freedom of association”.35   
The highlighted conflict indicates that the political role of religion has not been clarified. 
Section 31(1)(a) of the South African Constitution states that “when interpreting the Bill of 
Rights, a court, tribunal or forum — (a) must promote the values that underlie an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom”. This is further qualified by 
Section 9(1) and (2) which states:  
(1) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law. 
(2) Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To promote the 
achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons, 
or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.  
From this perspective, freedom and equality are the defining principles of the South African 
Constitution. Unfair discrimination by the state or any other person, group or institution are 
forbidden36. In most cases, based on its Constitutionally protected freedoms or rights, certain 
Christian values have been seen as infringing upon the rights of others. Dlulane (eNews 
Channel Africa, 2015) rightly describes such a situation as a “a clash between the right to 
religious freedom and the right not to be discriminated against”. Part of the dilemma has been 
how to reconcile the relationship between the essential values of Christianity through which 
Christians seek to influence the state and society on the one hand and the rights which they 
violate in the process of advocating such religious ethos or values on the other hand.  
According to van der Vyver (2012:151) the Courts have to “always try to reconcile the 
conflicting rights and freedoms, but where that becomes too challenging, the provision that is 
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most supportive of the basic norm will prevail”. Although the process of reconciling different 
conflicting rights has actually helped the Courts deal with various cases especially those 
brought by some Christian institutions37, what remains challenging is exactly how to maintain 
a fair balance between equality and other rights related to religion such as sovereignty or 
autonomy. The stance of the Courts has demonstrated that in “the course of debates concerning 
controversies, such as same sex marriage, public reason precludes exclusive appeal to the truth 
of a particular religious beliefs and doctrines” (Lenta 2009:28-29). This indicates that the rights 
concerning freedom of religion and belief which upholds religious liberty and how far it can 
go in influencing the decision or policy making and the society as a whole still have to be 
reinterpreted.  
In cases such as Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education [2000 (4) SA 757 
(CC)], Christian Education South Africa had to seek religious exemptions to practice its 
religious values based on the notion of religious liberty.  Clearly, where certain Christian 
institutions have tried to demand religious exemptions or special allowances which would 
violate or infringe the rights of others, the Court has had to reaffirm its sole duty through the 
constitutional principle of equality to protect and treat with equal respect all people regardless 
of whether they are secular or religious38. In cases where some Christian institutions have 
attempted to challenge the state through the Courts, they have been turned down. This is clear 
in cases such as Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education [2000 (4) SA 757 
(CC)] and the Minister of Home Affairs and Another v Fourie and Another.   
It seems that although the Constitution grants Christian institutions freedom of religion and 
belief, the “practice” or practical application of such beliefs or doctrines does not seem to be 
fully protected. A vital question arises here. Do such instances demonstrate that Christian 
believers are denied their rights to enjoy religious freedom guaranteed under clause 15 of the 
Constitution? If affirmative, does this then imply that their right to influence the state or 
political sphere with their values or religious convictions has been infringed? In responding to 
such questions, Mofokeng (2007:122) argues:  
the freedom of religion clause should be interpreted in a manner that would guarantee linguistic 
and religious communities the right to have their private law matters regulated in accordance 
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with the personal laws of their choice, provided they do not conflict with the spirit and values 
of the Constitution.  
What Mofokeng is advocating is the need for the state through the Courts to grants religions or 
in this case Christian institutions the right to follow their doctrines by regulating their customs 
and values without unnecessary intervention. This seems to have been the plea of Christian 
institutions in Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education and the Minister of 
Home Affairs and Another v Fourie and Another.  This would entail that Christian institutions 
are allowed to have an influence on the public sphere and engage with society with their values, 
a conclusion which could be abstracted following the judgement made by the Constitutional 
Court’s judgement in Ecclesia de Lange v Methodist Church of SA. Such influence is based on 




2.3 The Attempt of Christian Values to Influence the State/Society: Case Studies  
 
2.3.1 Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 
 
2.3.1.1 The Appellant’s (Christian Education South Africa) Stance  
 
Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education39 is one of the most significant cases 
in the history of the South African legal system where Christians actually challenged the 
Constitution with the aim of upholding religious ethos or values. In this case, the 
“constitutionality of a provision in the South African Schools Act, which prohibits corporal 
punishment in independent schools, was at issue” (van der Vyver 2012:166). The case was 
heard on 4th May 2000 in the Constitutional Court of South Africa and the judgment was 
delivered on 18th August 2000.  In this case, the appellant was Christian Education South Africa 
and the respondent was the Minister of Education. The Project NoSpank40 in its Report to 
Friends, (2000) asserts that “the appellant is a voluntary association of 196 independent 
Christian schools with a total of approximately 14 500 pupils”. Christian Education South 
Africa was established in 1983 mainly to promote Christian education in schools, especially 
those run or governed by Christians where religious values are part of the curriculum.  
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Christian education generally encourages parents, leaners and teachers to affirm Christian 
values as a foundational basis for learning. As the Christian Education National (2006) affirms, 
in Christian education, educators and learners are called to “to see and understand the world 
through the perspective of God’s truth. The Bible becomes the lens in which students’ view 
what they are learning”. Thus, in Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education the 
former affirmed that safeguarding Christian values and an environment which is favourable to 
and in conformity with the Christian faith was crucial. Christian Education South Africa 
challenged “the constitutionality of section 10 of the South African Schools Act, which 
proscribes corporal punishment in any school, public or private/independent” (du Plessis 
2010:20). Section 10 of the South African Schools Act of 1996 which deals with the 
"Prohibition of Corporal Punishment” states:  
(1) No person may administer corporal punishment at a school to a learner. (2) Any person who 
contravenes subsection (1) is guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a sentence which 
could be imposed for assault.  
According to this Act, administering corporal punishment at any school is a criminal offence. 
As Veriava (Mail & Guardian, 2013) observes, rather than engaging in corporal punishment, 
this Act affirms the need for “school governing bodies to develop codes of conduct that 
prescribe the rules that pupils must adhere to. The codes also establish due disciplinary 
processes when pupils have transgressed”.  Contrary to this Act, Christian Education South 
Africa argued that corporal punishment was a central element as far as Christian values are 
concerned in its schools. It argued that the proscription of corporal punishment stipulated by 
Section 10 of the South African Schools Act (1996) restricts the rights of parents which is 
extended to teachers to follow the categorical necessities of their faith.  
In Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education,41, the appellant contended that 
corporal punishment was “a vital aspect of the Christian religion and that it is applied in the 
light of its biblical context using biblical guidelines which impose a responsibility on parents 
for the training of their children”. The appellant quoted a number of verses from the Christian 
Bible which support the use of corporal punishment on children in the community42. The 
appellant further contended that parents have a responsibility imposed by God to train their 
children. On this ground, the Christian faith allows and obliges parents to delegate their 
responsibility to teachers who are to partner with them in the training and upbringing of child. 
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In that sense, “parents have the ultimate responsibility to educate their children towards…a 
Christian way of living. The Christian school community is a partnership with parents and the 
school sharing in this vision” (Christian Education National, 2016).  
The appellant thus claimed that corporal punishment was inseparable from the dictates and 
understanding of Christian values and religious expression. They added that parents who sent 
their children to Christian schools where Christian education is paramount had to sign a 
document known as “Consent to Corporal Punishment” which gives the school and teachers a 
right to use corporal correction, otherwise, they were free to send their children somewhere 
else43. As Lenta (2009:38-39) puts it, the appellant contended that “parents had expressly 
agreed to the infliction of corporal punishment on their children at school, and there was an 
exit option for parents unwilling to allow their children to be subjected to corporal 
punishment”. The appellant further argued that Section 10 of the South African Schools Acts 
infringes certain provisions of the South African Constitution as far as religious freedom was 
concerned.  
Firstly, they argued that Section 14 of the South African Constitution on “Privacy” states that 
“Everyone has the right to privacy…”. Based on this provision, Christian schools had the right 
to privacy which allowed them to apply corporal punishment in accordance with their Christian 
values. Secondly, they cited Section 15 (1) of the South African Constitution on “Freedom of 
Religion, Belief and Opinion” which states that “everyone has the right to freedom of 
conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion”. The appellant argued that forbidding 
corporal punishment in Christian schools infringes their freedom of religion and belief which 
includes administering corporal punishment to their children as already highlighted above. 
Thirdly, the appellant argued that forbidding corporal punishment in Christian schools 
infringes their Constitutional right to “Education” stipulated by Section 29 (3) of the 
Constitution which states that “everyone has the right to establish and maintain, at their own 
expense, independent educational institutions…”. Fourthly, the appellant appealed to the 
Constitutional Court based on the contention that forbidding corporal punishment in Christian 
schools infringes its Constitutional right to “Language and Culture” which according to Section 
30 of the Constitution states: “everyone has the right to use the language and to participate in 
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the cultural life of their choice”. Finally, the appellant also cited Section 31 of the South African 
Constitution on “Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities” which affirms:  
(1) Persons belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic community may not be denied the 
right, with other members of that community — (a) to enjoy their culture, practise their religion 
and use their language; and (b) to form, join and maintain cultural, religious and linguistic 
associations and other organs of civil society. (2) The rights in subsection (1) may not be 
exercised in a manner inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights. 
Based on all the highlighted arguments from the religious and Constitutional perspectives, the 
appellant highlighted that forbidding corporal punishment hinders them from practicing their 
beliefs and religious ethos, and thus the Schools Act had to be declared unconstitutional. Such 
a declaration would be justified given that its provisions obstructed the ‘right to freedom of 
religion’ stipulated by the Constitution and the cultural life in independent and private schools.  
In line with this, the appellant demanded to “have section 10 declared unconstitutional and 
invalid to the extent that it prohibits corporal punishment in independent schools where parents 
have consented to its application”44. 
 
2.3.1.2 The Respondent’s (Minister of Education) Stance  
 
In this case the Minister of Education as the respondent did not agree with the appellant. 
According to the Project NoSpank in its Report to Friends (2000), the respondent argued that 
it was the “infliction, not the prohibition, of corporal punishment that infringed the 
Constitutional rights of children and their rights to equality, human dignity and freedom and 
security of the person”. Following this argument, the limitation of corporal punishment was 
justifiable even if it might have limited the applicant’s religious rights, which included the right 
to freedom of religion.  The Minister of Education argued that the argument of the appellant to 
be granted freedom to exercise Christian ethos and values in the case of administering corporal 
punishment in its schools is contrary to certain provisions of the Constitution in the Bill of 
Rights45.  
The respondent contended that corporal punishment is contrary to Section 9 of the South 
African Constitution on “Equality” which states that “everyone is equal before the law and has 
the right to equal protection and benefit of the law”; Section 10 on “Human Dignity” which 
stipulates that “everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and 
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protected” and Section 28 on “Children” which affirms that “every child has the right – …(d) 
to be protected from maltreatment, neglect, abuse or degradation”. The respondent also 
highlighted that the appellant’s contention was against Section 12 (1) of the Constitution on 
“Freedom and Security of the Person” which states: 
 Everyone has the right to freedom and security of the person, which includes the right —…(c) 
to be free from all forms of violence from either public or private sources; (d) not to be tortured 
in any way; and (e) not to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way.   
In Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education, the respondent “furthermore 
places reliance on section 31(2) which states that section 31(1) rights ‘may not be exercised in 
a manner inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights’”46. On the behalf of the Minister 
of Education, the Director-General of the Department of Education highlighted that Section 
3(4)(n) of the National Education Policy Act adopted in 1996 by Parliament mandates the 
Minister of Education to:  
Control and discipline of students at education institutions: Provided that no person shall 
administer corporal punishment, or subject a student to psychological or physical abuse at any 
education institution. 
The quoted clause shows that it was within the rights of the respondent to repel any appeals 
advanced by the applicant which seem to purport or advocate corporal punishment. The 
Director-General of the Department of Education on behalf of the respondent further 
highlighted that the preamble of the same National Education Policy Act “facilitates the 
democratic transformation of the national system of education into one which serves the needs 
and interests of all the people of South Africa and upholds their fundamental rights”.47 Thus, 
based on the above arguments both from the perspective of the South African Constitution and 
the National Education Policy Act, the respondent firmly held that Christian schools cannot be 
permitted to employ corporal punishment based on the arguments they advanced.  
 
2.3.1.3 Judgement of the Constitutional Court  
 
In this case, the Constitutional Court had to decide whether or not Christian schools would be 
given a special allowance to employ corporal punishment despite the arguments of the 
respondent which are in line with the general constitutional ban of such an exercise in all 
schools. As Veriava (Mail & Guardian, 2013) puts it, “the Constitutional Court had to 
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determine whether the prohibition against corporal punishment violated the rights of parents 
who, in line with their religious convictions, had consented to its use”. This issue was complex. 
To start with, “it is clear from the above that a multiplicity of intersecting constitutional values 
and interests are involved in the present matter — some overlapping, some competing”.48 For 
example, both the appellant or applicant and respondent use the Constitution in backing up 
their stance and claims.   
In weighing the arguments from both the perspective of the appellant, the respondent and the 
stipulations of the Constitution, “Sachs J on behalf of a unanimous court said that he would 
assume in the appellant’s favour that religious and community rights of the appellant had been 
limited” and maintained that “the question then was whether such limitation was justifiable” 
(Project NoSpank, 2000). From the statement of Judge Sachs, the question that is central is 
whether or not a “justification of the limitation of the right to religious freedom and religious 
community practice” would be possible especially with reference to “section 36 of the 
limitations clause”.49 For example, Section 36 of the South African Constitution places limits 
on the Bill of Rights which contains the freedom of religion and belief if such freedom 
diminishes or violates the basic principle of human dignity50. According to van der Vyver 
(2012:167), in considering other conditions at play, Judge Sachs affirmed:  
The underlying problem in any open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality 
and freedom in which conscientious and religious freedom has to be regarded with appropriate 
seriousness, is how far such democracy can and must go in allowing members of religious 
communities to define for themselves which laws they will obey and which not. Such a society 
can cohere only if all its participants accept that certain basic norms and standards are binding.  
Judge Sachs highlighted that the appellant cannot consider the right to be exempted from the 
generally applicable Constitutional provisions based on the right to practice religious ethos, 
and by extension in fostering them to the general public. Nevertheless, he compromisingly 
pointed out that it would be unfair for the appellant to be put on the extremely troublesome 
situation of choosing either to follow the demands of faith and the stipulations of the 
Constitution. He asserted that religious believers need to be given enough room to both follow 
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the dictates of their beliefs and the demands of the state. In this case, “what they were prevented 
from doing was to authorise teachers, acting in their name and on school premises, to fulfil 
what they regarded as their conscientious and biblically-ordained responsibilities” (Project 
NoSpank, 2000). The parents and teachers could maintain Christian ethos in their schools which 
should nevertheless exclude the delegation of teachers to inflict corporal punishment on the 
learners.  
The Constitutional Court had to put children’s rights at the centre of the case by highlighting 
the need for their protection from all forms of abuse and violence, including corporal 
punishment. In its Report to Friends, Project NoSpank (2000) argued that when all the 
highlighted “factors were weighed together, the scales came down firmly in favour of 
upholding the generality of the law in the face of the appellant’s claim for a Constitutionally 
compelled exemption”. In this case, “Sachs J handed down a carefully reasoned judgement 
dismissing the appeal on the basis that section 1051 imposes a constitutionally acceptable 
limitation on parents’ free exercise of their beliefs” (du Plessis 2010:21)52.  
The Constitutional Court reaffirmed that corporal punishment was contrary to the stipulations 
of the Constitution and that a limitation on the ‘right to freedom of religion’ and belief was 
required in order to protect the children against such inhumane punishment.  As Veriava (Mail 
& Guardian, 2013) puts it, the Court maintained “the prohibition and found that corporal 
punishment is a violation of the legal rights of the pupil to human dignity, freedom of security 
of person and protection from maltreatment, neglect, abuse or degradation”53.  
 
2.3.1.4 Comment  
 
Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education case was primarily based on religious 
freedom as a Constitutional right which religious institutions are entitled. Christian Education 
South Africa developed its arguments from both religious dictates and the Constitutional 
stipulations concerning the right of religious freedom. The Minister of Education also brought 
forward arguments from both Constitutional and National Education Policy Act perspectives. 
                                                          
51 Section 10 of the South African Constitution on ‘Human Dignity’ states that “everyone has inherent dignity and 
the right to have their dignity respected and protected”.  
52 Explaining the reason for the ban on corporal punishment, Justice Albie Sachs maintained that “the deliberate 
infliction of pain with a cane on a tender part of the body as well as the institutionalised nature of the procedure 
involved an element of cruelty in the system that sanctioned it. The activity is planned beforehand; it is deliberate”.  
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The case partly involves an internal conflict of various Constitutional rights which go as far as 
involving the crucial Constitutional value of human dignity. While the parents have the right 
of freedom of religion through which they claim the right to educate their child in line with 
their Christian ethos and beliefs, the children are at same time as human beings entitled to be 
protected constitutionally from all forms of violence, and in this case, corporal punishment.  
The judgement of the Constitutional Court illustrates that based on the South African 
Constitution, the “right to freedom of religion” and by extension, its ability to influence the 
state with its values can be limited if it is contrary to the constitutional principles of human 
dignity and equality. The Court through its judgement placed a limit on the free exercise and 
influence of Christian values and ethos in Christian institutions and society at large, especially 
in cases where such values violate or harm a third party. Given that allowing corporal 
punishment in Christian institutions violated certain Constitutional values or fundamental 
rights, “the Court refused to grant an exemption in Christian Education” (Lenta 2009:40).  
Nevertheless, its cautious judgement also demonstrates how forceful certain Christian values 
are in the society54. Freedom of religion, which involves both having religious convictions and 
practising them, was affirmed as an essential right (Kroeze 2003:114). Further, although the 
Court ruled against the arguments of the appellant, it however maintained the necessity of 
religion and the relevance of its ethos to the general public. In that way, the Court carefully and 
cautiously dismissed the arguments of the appellant without necessarily infringing upon the 
“right to freedom of religion” and belief, and by extension, its ability to influence the general 
public and policy making processes. It for example, argued that the Christian belief and 
doctrine on corporal punishment does not grant teachers the right to employ corporal 
punishment on leaners, although this prohibition does not extend to parents at their homes. 
The judgement also showed that believers might not necessarily be coerced to act against their 
religious convictions. As du Plessis (2010:22) highlights, Christian Education South Africa v 
Minister of Education was “one Constitutional Court Judgement in which the significance of 
religious and related rights was stated most unequivocally”. The Court reaffirmed the 
importance of religious beliefs in regulating the moral order. The Court also granted that 
Christian values can influence the general public as long as they do not infringe the rights of a 
third party as corporal punishment does. 
 
                                                          




2.3.2 Minister of Home Affairs and Another v Fourie and Another 
 
2.3.2.1 The Appellant’s (Fourie and Another) Stance  
  
The case dubbed Minister of Home Affairs and Another v Fourie and Another55 was heard on 
17th May 2005 and decided upon on 1st December 2005. In this case, Ms Cecelia Bonthuys and 
Ms Marié Fourie were appellants in the Constitutional Court of South Africa. The couple had 
been involved in a same-sex romantic relationship for more than ten years and their relationship 
had also been acknowledged by their families and friends.  When they decided to “get public 
recognition and registration of their relationship, and formally to embrace the rights and 
responsibilities” through marriage, “there was one impediment. They are both women.56 From 
a historical perspective, Church (2006:99) argues:  
 In South Africa until recently the traditional notion of marriage as a legal institution was that 
it was the voluntary union for life in common of one man and one woman, to the exclusion of 
all others while it lasted.  The celebrated common-law definition of heterosexual marriage held 
sway.   
The applicants contended that the common or traditional law prevents them from publicly 
celebrating the mutual commitment and love which they genuinely share through marriage. 
The law does not only prevent them from making their union official, but that it also 
discriminates against them and infringes their constitutional rights. The applicants also 
contended “that the exclusion comes from the common law definition which states that 
marriage in South Africa is ‘a union of one man with one woman, to the exclusion, while it 
lasts, of all others’”57.  
The definition of marriage was partly based on the common law and demanded that for a union 
to acquire a legal status and thus to be formalised, it ought to be in accordance with the 
stipulations of Act 25 of the 1961 Marriage Act.  The Act affirms that a minister of a particular 
religion is free to use the Marriage Formula which is regulated in terms of his or her beliefs 
and those of the couple in question. However, according to Clause 30(1) of the Act, in the case 
of non-religious marriage officers, the following question (which is part of the marriage 
formula) must be put before each party in consideration:  
Do you, A.B., declare that as far as you know there is no lawful impediment to your proposed 
marriage with C.D. here present, and that you call all here present to witness that you take C.D. 
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57 The same sentiment is expressed by Judge Innes in Mashia Ebrahim v Mahomed Essop [1905 TS 59] para. 61. 




as your lawful wife (or husband)?’, and thereupon the parties shall give each other the right 
hand and the marriage officer concerned shall declare the marriage solemnized in the following 
words: ‘I declare that A.B. and C.D. here present have been lawfully married. 
The particular reference to “wife” or “husband” embedded in this formula clearly excludes 
them (Ngcukaitobi 2012 :233). However, the applicants did not directly challenge the 
highlighted marriage formula58. What they opposed against was the reference to “wife (or 
husband)” mentioned in the civil marriage formula as contained in Act 25 of the 1961 Marriage 
Act which by implication supported the presupposition that a marriage had to be between a 
man (husband) and a woman (wife) according to the general understanding. Further, with 
reference to the Constitution, the appellants argued that the Bill of Rights protects them from 
unfair treatment and discrimination based on their sexual orientation. For example, Section 
9(1) of the Constitution states that “Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal 
protection and benefit of the law”. The stipulation is further qualified by Section 9(3) which 
reads:  
The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more 
grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, 
sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth. 
 
 
2.3.2.2 The Religious (Christian) Arguments  
 
Among various arguments that were advanced in support of the traditional marriage on the part 
of the respondent, this paper only focuses on religious ones especially those that were raised 
or advanced by Christians who were the second amicus curiae59 in the Court on this case and 
had submitted an affidavit. The major argument concerned the procreative element or factor 
which according to the Christian ethos was the primary and sore purpose of any marriage and 
conjugal love. The argument was provided by a Christian association known as Marriage 
Alliance of South Africa which represents the majority of Christian churches and faith-based 
organisations in South Africa60.  
                                                          
58 The formula was challenged in Lesbian and Gay Equality Project and Others V.  Minister of Home Affairs and 
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59 Amicus curiae means “friend of the Court”. In this case, the Marriage Alliance of South Africa stood as an 
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South Africa were: Cardinal Wilfrid Napier (Chairman of the Southern Africa Bishops Conference); Rev Moss 
Ntlha (General Secretary of the Evangelical Alliance of South Africa) and Dr Michael Cassidy (International 




According to Amazon Web Services (2006), the Marriage Alliance of South Africa argued that 
the “the purpose of marriage is to… establish the proper environment for procreation and 
nurture of godly offspring”. In this case, the procreative prospect was highlighted as being the 
basis and constrictive feature of marriage, in which case the union between Ms Cecelia 
Bonthuys and Ms Marié Fourie do not fit or qualify. While advocating for a traditional 
definition of marriage, the Marriage Alliance of South Africa firmly maintained:  
We believe that the extension of the definition of marriage to include same-sex couples would 
seriously undermine marriage and the family as the fundamental building blocks of society.  
We believe marriage is intended to be the life-long union of a man and a woman (Amazon Web 
Services, 2006).  
From that perspective, the Marriage Alliance of South Africa highlighted that by their very 
nature same-sex unions cannot acquire the official marital status to the point of being 
considered marriage or even closely comparable to marriage. Here, “the corollary is that such 
unions can never be regarded as marriages, or even marriage-like or equivalent to marriages”61. 
From the viewpoint of the Marriage Alliance, allowing same-sex unions to acquire marital 
status especially in religious setups would be a violation of the right to the freedom of religion, 
given that the traditional definition of marriage forms one of the central Christian values. Put 
alternatively, since “Marriage is the sacred union between one man and one woman; the 
practicing of homosexuality, is sinful before God and therefore forbidden” (Freedom of 
Religion South Africa, 2015).  
Whilst the hearing of the case under consideration was underway, many Christian organisations 
supported the Marriage Alliance’s position through protests, matches and public 
pronouncement through media and press releases. For example, the African Christian 
Democratic Party (ACDP) clearly highlighted that it was against same-sex unions and its 
legalisation, and had expressed its hopes that the Constitutional Court would rule against such 
unions. According to the Mail & Guardian (2005), Kenneth Meshoe, leader of the ACDP said:  
The ACDP has continually said that we do not support the legalisation of so-called gay 
marriages, as this, among other things, will lead to the acceleration of the breakdown of the 
family, meaning that our country faces severe degeneration of morals and a high divorce rate. 
By upholding the definition of marriage as being between a male and female, the Constitutional 
Court will be in line with the majority of nations across the world that have upheld this view. 
We trust that the Constitutional Court will rule in favour of the wishes of the majority of South 
Africans.  
                                                          




Thus, the Marriage Alliance of South Africa with the support of various churches, religious 
institutions and Christian political associations such as the African Christian Democratic Party 
maintained that Ms Cecelia Bonthuys and Ms Marié Fourie and any other same-sex couples 
should not be granted the allowance for marriage by the Constitutional Court. According to 
Lenta (2009:28) and as already highlighted above, they argued that “same-sex marriage is 
inconsistent with passages of the Old and New Testament of the Bible”. Understood from this 
perspective, only a man and a woman qualify to form a marriage based on matrimonial love 
and to whose case the Marriage Formula of “wife (or husband)” highlighted in Section 30 (1) 
of the 1961 Marriage Act 25 rightly applies62.  
 
2.3.2.3 Judgement of the Constitutional Court 
 
In its decision, the Constitutional Court strongly condemned the societal negative attitudes 
regarding same-sex unions which was first and foremost underlined by discrimination based 
on sexual orientation. The Court held that denying Ms Cecelia Bonthuys and Ms Marié Fourie 
the institution of marriage would be a substantial discrimination of their rights based on Section 
9 of the South African Constitution under the heading ‘Equality’. Section 9 of the South 
African Constitution states:  
(1) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law. 
(2) Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms…(3) The state 
may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, 
including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual 
orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.  
With reference to the above, the Court affirmed that the Constitution protects same-sex couples 
from being discriminated by any person, organisation or institution based on their sexual 
orientation. According to Judge Sachs, “to penalise people for being who and what they are is 
profoundly disrespectful of the human personality and violators of equality. Equality means 
equal concern and respect across difference” (Heyns and Partners, 2013). Thus, according to 
Church (2006:99) in the final judgement the “the common law definition of marriage was 
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declared to be inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid” by the Constitutional Court’s 
unanimous decision.  
The Court found that the common law discriminated against same-sex couples and that it 
unfairly denied them the right to enjoy the responsibilities and status of the institution of 
marriage that was being given to heterosexual unions or couples. The discrimination of same-
sex unions which was caused by the discrepancy within the stipulations of the common law 
and the 1961 Marriage Act 25 by favouring heterosexual unions was affirmed as having been 
an infringement of the Constitutional rights due to the appellants. In that way, the 
Constitutional Court declared that the common law definition of marriage, and Section 30(1) 
of the Marriage Act, which excluded same-sex marriages, were inconsistent with Sections 9(1) 
and 9(3) and Section 10 of the Constitution that deal with the right to equality and the right to 
human dignity respectively.  
By upholding this stance, the Court dismissed the arguments raised by the Marriage Alliance 
of South Africa that marriage is primarily for procreation and raising of children.  The Court 
stressed that “however persuasive procreative potential might be in the context of a particular 
religious world-view, from a legal and constitutional point of view, it is not a defining 
characteristic of conjugal relationships”.63 From the constitutional perspective, considering 
procreation as the basis of marriage discriminates against same-sex unions by infringing on 
their rights. Even in terms of heterosexual couples, holding procreation as the sole purpose and 
basis of marriage would demean couples who might be incapable of procreation for one reason 
or the other. The Court also cited couples who may desire marriage when their capacity to 
conceive has already passed and also couples who might be married but decide through their 
right to privacy and freedom not to have either sexual relations or children 64. While reacting 
to the arguments that were presented in Court by the Marriage Alliance of South Africa, Judge 
Sachs asserted:  
“It is one thing for the Court to acknowledge the important role that religion plays in our public 
life. It is quite another to use religious doctrine as a source for interpreting the Constitution. It 
would be out of order to employ the religious sentiments of some as a guide to the constitutional 
rights of others”.65   
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2.3.2.4 Comment  
 
The Minister of Home Affairs and Another v Fourie and Another indicates that freedom of 
religion and the rights of believers cannot negate the Constitutional rights of Ms Cecelia 
Bonthuys and Ms Marié Fourie or any other same-sex couple, primarily based on the already 
highlighted Section 9 of the Constitution on “Equality”. Although the Court acknowledged the 
significance of Christianity and religion in general and the relevance of its values in the general 
public, it clearly contended that religious beliefs do not hold prominence over the Constitution 
as far as equality is concerned. The Court highlighted the need for the state to prevent unfair 
discrimination based on Constitutional rights. Here, there seem to be an assumption that where 
the “right to freedom of religion” and autonomy – which act as a basis for the influence of 
religious values – conflict with other Constitutional rights, there is a need to maintain a balance 
based on the principle of equality.  However, the Constitutional Court’s judgement was unclear 
on the influence of Christian values when it stated:   
the recognition of same-sex marriages would in no way force religious institutions to accept or 
perform such marriages within their chosen belief, nor would the recognition deprive any 
religion or heterosexual couple from marrying within the tenets of their beliefs (Heyns and 
Partners, 2013).  
The ruling accepts the relevance and influence of Christian values within religious circles. 
Further, though Ms Cecelia Bonthuys and Ms Marié Fourie can legally enter into a same sex 
union, Christian institutions are not coerced to accept or perform such unions based on their 
categorical commands. By reaffirming religious autonomy and self-determinism, this points to 
a certain predicament. One may establish that Christian institutions are free to regulate which 
values to uphold and which ones not to uphold based on their own biblical rules and regulations. 
This follows that even if Ms Cecelia Bonthuys and Ms Marié Fourie won the Court case and 
are free to engage in marriage through a civil union, they can nevertheless still be denied the 
right to have their marriage approved by the Marriage Alliance of South Africa or other 
religious institutions which do not allow same-sex unions. In the Minister of Home Affairs and 
Another v Fourie and Another, although the Constitutional Court judged against the stance of 
the Marriage Alliance of South Africa, the judgement highlights the forcefulness of religious 







2.3.3 The Ecclesia de Lange v Methodist Church of SA 
 
2.3.3.1 Case   
 
The De Lange v Presiding Bishop of the Methodist Church of Southern Africa for the Time 
Being and Another [2015 ZACC 35]66 was a case heard by the Constitutional Court on 28th 
August 2015 and decided upon on 24th November 2015. In this case, the applicant, Ms De 
Lange was made a probationary minister of the Methodist Church of South Africa in August 
2001. In 2006, she was then made a full minister of the forenamed Church and had since then 
been a serving different congregations. Being lesbian, Ms De Lange began a relationship with 
another woman, which deepened as time went on. While Ms De Lange was serving a 
congregation in Cape Town, her partner moved in and they began living together67.  
In December 2005 when Ms De Lange was assigned to serve at a church in Vredekloof, her 
partner also moved in and they continued staying together even after the applicant began 
serving congregations at Windsor Park and Brackenfell in 2006. On 8th December 2009, “the 
Methodist Church discontinued De Lange’s services as ordained minister of the Church, 
following her announcement that she intended marrying her same-sex partner” (Freedom of 
Religion South Africa, 2015). The church told the applicant that her impeachment was based 
on Article 4.82 of the Laws and Discipline of the Methodist Church of South Africa which 
states that “Ministers shall observe and implement the provisions of Laws and Discipline and 
all other policies, decisions, practices and usages of the Church”68.  
By her showing a desire to enter into a marital union with a woman, the churches maintained 
that she had violated its policy stipulated in the provisions of Laws and Discipline which does 
not approve same-sex marriages. Badenhorst (Freedom of Religion South Africa, 2015) 
summarises the beliefs of the Methodist Church which is shared among almost all Christian 
denominations and institutions in South Africa concerning marriage which the applicant was 
guilty of violating:  
The Methodist Church believes that according to the Bible, marriage is a divinely-ordained 
lifelong union of one man and one woman, and that any other understanding of marriage is 
incompatible with the Scriptures and thus with Church doctrine. (This view of marriage is of 
course central to the Christian faith, and is held by the majority of Christian churches around 
the world).   
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Following Clause 4.82 of the Laws and Discipline of the Methodist Church of South Africa, 
the Church highlighted that Ms De Lange as a minister had an irrevocable mandate of being 
the custodian of the beliefs and doctrines of the Church. For example, as a minister she may 
“not enter into same-sex or any other form of marriage contrary to the Church’s understanding 
of marriage as a sacred covenant by one man and one woman” (Freedom of Religion South 
Africa, 2015). Based on this stance on the part of the Church, Ms De Lange was suspended 
from the Church on 10th December 2009. In line with the stipulations of the Civil Union Act 
17 of 2006, Ms De Lange soon after her dismissal entered into a union with her partner, 
although they later divorced.  
The District Disciplinary Committee of the Methodist Church examined the suspension 
together with the charges against Ms De Lange and confirmed the suspension on 13th January 
201069. The District Disciplinary Committee argued that “the discrimination against Ms De 
Lange is justified as the Church is entitled, in terms of sections 15 and 18 of the Constitution, 
to require its ministers not to enter into any marriage or civil union other than a heterosexual 
one” (Constitutionally Speaking, 2015). When Ms De Lange appealed the decision of the 
District Disciplinary Committee to the Connexional Disciplinary Committee which is the 
highest Disciplinary Committee of the Methodist Church in South Africa, it also reaffirmed the 
earlier judgement and charged that “she remained an ordained minister, but was barred from 
exercising any ministerial functions, holding any station or receiving any emoluments”.70 
Having been turned down by both the District Disciplinary Committee and the Connexional 
Disciplinary Committee, Ms De Lange appealed to arbitration in terms of Article 5.11 of the 
Laws and Discipline of the Methodist Church of South Africa which calls for mandatory 
Arbitration when disagreements occur between ministers and the church leadership. In terms 
of clause 5.11 of the Laws and Discipline of the Methodist Church of South Africa, “if a matter 
is referred to arbitration, the finding of the Arbitrator shall be final and binding on all Ministers 
and members of the church”. The same clause (clause 5.11) states:  
No legal proceedings shall be instituted by any formal or informal structure or grouping of the 
church or any minister or any member of the church, acting in their personal or official capacity, 
against the church or any formal or informal structure or grouping of the Church, Minister or 
member thereof for any matter which in any way arises from or relates to the mission work, 
activities or governance of the church. The mediation and arbitration processes and forums 
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prescribed and provided for by the church for conflict dispute resolution (Appendix 14) must 
be used by all Ministers and members of the church.  
Between March 2010 and May 2011, Ms De Lange tried to sort out her case with the arbitrator 
and the convenor but later gave up by refusing “to make further submissions to the convener 
or engage further with the arbitration process on the grounds that doing so would be futile… 
unfair and serve no purpose”.71 Ms De Lange did not also observe further dates for the 
arbitration process as arranged by the arbitrator, and after setting the arbitration agreement72 
aside, she brought the case to the High Court for hearing. In the High Court, she firstly 
advanced the claim that she had been unfairly discriminated based on her sexual orientation 
but later on gave up this argument. Upon examining her argument that the arbitration process 
be declared invalid and that she be reinstated by the church as a minister, the High Court judged 
that “she must submit to arbitration as it could not be said that arbitration would be unfair or 
futile.”73  
When Ms De Lange latter appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal, the Court reaffirmed the 
judgement of the High Court by stating that “the concurring judgment nudged the parties to 
remove their dispute from the judicial secular arena, and to resolve it in accordance with clause 
5.11 of the Laws and Discipline”.74 Here, one may remark that both the High Court and the 
Supreme Court of Appeal ruled in favour of the right to self-determination of the Methodist 
Church which shows the forcefulness of Christian values. Having been turned down by both 
the High Court and Supreme Court of Appeal, Ms De Lange appealed to the Constitutional 
Court based on the argument that she had been unfairly discriminated. She argued that the 
Methodist Church of South Africa had unfairly dismissed and suspended her and had 
unlawfully withheld her ministerial roles.  According to Badenhorst (Freedom of Religion 
South Africa, 2015), in her appeal to the Constitutional Court, Ms De Lange asked “the Court 
to find that the Church unfairly discriminated against her on the basis of sexual orientation and 
that she should be reinstated as minister of the Methodist Church”.  
By suspending and forbidding her from performing her duties as a minister, she asserted the 
Church had by insinuation infringed her rights against certain constitutional provisions which 
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protects her from being discriminated unfairly by anyone based on her sexual orientation as 
stipulated in Sections 9 and 10 of the South African Constitution. She also argued that the 
conduct of the Church by suspending her was contrary to the stipulations of the Unfair 
Discrimination Act of 2000. In that way, she further asked the Court to overrule the Methodist 
Church’s arbitration agreement by declaring her dismissal as having being constitutionally 
unfair and subsequently, to declare it void before the Constitution of the land. She also asked 
the Court to coerce the Methodist Church to revoke the suspension and reinstate her as a 
minister of the Church.  
However, the Constitutional Court found that she had earlier on disavowed the unfair 
discrimination argument in the High Court when she stated:  
This is not a case where I complain about unequal treatment. Although unequal treatment is at 
the heart of the matter that is not an issue before this Court. All that this Honourable Court must 
decide is whether the Disciplinary Committee’s decision is a rational just administrative action 
or not.75  
Subsequently, when she restated the argument of unfair discrimination in the Supreme Court 
of Appeal, the Court also refused to hear the case since she had earlier plainly renounced her 
claim of unfair discrimination in the High Court. Following the Supreme Court of Appeal’s 
decision, the Constitutional Court equally dismissed her argument of unfair discrimination on 
the basis that she had earlier on deserted such a claim in the High Court. According to Watson 
(The Citizen, 2015), while highlighting that the applicant should have advanced her unfair 
discrimination argument from the start rather than desert it in the process, the Constitutional 
Court asserted that “if and when the unfair discrimination claim has been properly ripened, it 
will require all the judicial, if not Solomonic, wisdom we Judges can muster right through our 
court system”. 
In its final judgement, the Court charged that the applicant was out of order by failing to submit 
to the arbitration agreement process according to clause 3(2) of the Arbitration Act as regulated 
by the Church even after she had agreed to undergo such a process by signing the arbitration 
order. The Court held that in sensitive issues like the one under consideration which relates to 
church dogma or scripture and its interpretation, internal church processes such as arbitration 
was the ideal medium to analyse the matter of whether the applicant should or should not be 
allowed to continue exercising her ministerial duties even if she is engaged in a same-sex 
marriage. The Court agreed with the Church that the applicant should be subjected to the 





arbitration process in line with the rules of the Church, thus the Court advised the applicant to 
restate the arbitration process and submit to it.   
When she argued that such a process would be biased and unfair since the process itself, the 
arbitrator and the convenor were either members of the Church or at least appointed by the 
Church itself which do not approve same-sex unions, such a claim was dismissed by the Court. 
The Constitutional Court highlighted that it would not interfere since the issue at hand regards 
church values and doctrine, and that the forum provided by the arbitration of the Church was 
the correct setting to deal with the issue, although this process would be subjected to judicial 
examination if the applicant had advanced the equality or unfair discrimination claim from the 
beginning and had not deserted it in the process as she had done. In its conclusion, the 
Constitutional Court reasoned:  
arbitration is the appropriate forum to decide if the line that has been drawn by the Church in 
Ms De Lange’s case is acceptable. It would not be appropriate for this Court to interfere at this 
stage especially considering that the line is close to the Church’s doctrines and values. No good 
reason has been shown why arbitration would not be suited to resolving the present dispute76.  
 
2.3.3.2 Comment   
 
What makes Ecclesia de Lange v Methodist Church of South Africa a crucial case is the fact 
that the appellant was referred back to the Arbitration process of her local Church. If the Court 
had not referred the applicant back to the arbitration process but had passed judgment based on 
the unfair discrimination argument, it would have demonstrated how far the state through the 
Constitution can go in limiting the influence of religious values in the public sphere. Being the 
supreme law which grants essential rights to all people and clarify which values are generally 
applicable, how far can the state go in limiting Christian values without infringing the “right to 
freedom of religion” and self-determination or autonomy? Notwithstanding the question, the 
case remains a ground-breaking court case with regards to the autonomy of Christianity and 
freedom of religion and how far church values can go in the public sphere in as far as the 
constitutional limits are concerned. Commenting on the issue before the judgement was 
delivered by the Constitutional Court, Freedom of Religion South Africa (2015) lamented:  
This is undoubtedly the most important case for religious freedom and the autonomy of the 
Church that has ever come before our courts, and one that could open the door to the courts 
                                                          




dictating to the Church what she may and may not believe, preach and how she should govern 
her internal affairs (i.e. to religious persecution in South Africa). 
If the Court had considered hearing the case on the grounds of unfair discrimination, which it 
avoided doing, this would have led to various implications on the issue of religious freedom 
and values. For example, if the applicant had won the case, the ability of the Church to regulate 
its own affairs through which it influences the state and the policy making process would have 
been deeply curtailed. Subsequently, the Methodist Church would have been forced not only 
to reinstate the appellant as a minister of the Church, but to start accepting people from same-
sex marriages or unions as Church ministers. Such a move on the part of the Court would have 
also entailed that the arbitration process and the Clause 4.82 of the Laws and Discipline of the 
Methodist Church had to be overruled or considered invalid. According to Freedom of Religion 
South Africa (2015) by implication, the Courts would successfully start:  
Telling the Church how to govern her affairs; dictating what the Church (and therefore, also its 
members) may and may not believe, and may and may not preach – what is acceptable, and 
what is not…and Forcing the Church (including pastors and members) to act against their 
conscience, religion and belief.  
Such would have been a plausible implication because the current attempts of Christian 
churches in South Africa to influence society and public decision making processes in the legal 
sphere with its values would have been refuted. It would not for example, publicly affirm the 
religious arguments which according to Christian belief are the main reason for marriage to be 
limited to a man and a woman. Further, Christian churches which do not favour same-sex union 
would have been obliged to conduct same-sex marriages or ceremonies and failure to do so, 
would have been a violation of the right to equality which prohibits unfair discrimination based 
on sexual orientation and would led to penalisation or imprisonment (Constitutionally 
Speaking, 2015).  
Christians would have been forced to comply with the regulations of the state with regards to 
its affairs and how far Christian institutions can go in engaging with the general public and 
political arena with arguments that are based on its doctrines and sacred scripture. Clearly, by 
directing the applicant to return to the arbitration process, the Constitutional Court safeguarded 
the freedom of religion and its autonomy and denied the state’s ability to cross the line of the 
Church’s self-determination and autonomy. By implication, this decision did not only show the 




for such values in the public sphere, especially in religious spheres and the inability of the state 
to intervene in such cases.  
The Court seem to have agreed with the affirmation of Freedom of Religion South Africa that 
“it is not for the State (government / courts) to tell us what we may and may not believe, preach 
and how we should run our internal affairs!” (Freedom of Religion South Africa, 2015). By 
referring the applicant back to the arbitration process, this raises a vital question which shows 
the fact that the Constitution is not clear as far as religious influences are concerned in the 
public sphere. In line with this, Mofokeng (2007:124) raises a vital question:  
the question is whether it is possible for a person to belong to a religious group, and to have the 
freedom of religion as guaranteed under section 15 of the Constitution without the legal 
recognition and protection of the right to put that religion or opinion into practice? 
One may question Section 15(3) of the Constitution which although recognises the importance 
of religious convictions or practices and their autonomy, is not really helpful in regulating how 
far Christian values can go in influencing the public sphere with its values in as far as religious 
freedom is concerned (van der Vyver 2012:149). Nevertheless, in the Ecclesia de Lange v 
Methodist Church of SA which is a recent case, one can see just how influential Christian values 
are in the public sphere based on freedom of religion and the provision of autonomy and self-
determination through which the Court has hesitated to trespass.  
 
2.4 Conclusion  
 
This chapter discussed the Constitutional Court’s appraisal of religious freedom post-1996. 
The first part of the chapter clarified the predicament or clash of rights which has arisen from 
the influence of certain Christian values in society. Based on the constitutional guarantees of 
religious freedom deliberated on in the previous chapter, Christian values and their influence 
sometimes conflict with other constitutionally protected rights and democratic values in 
society. This is partly due to the unclear position of religious freedom and its boundaries in 
society. The chapter affirmed that although the Constitution guarantees the freedom of religious 
belief, the guarantees regarding the observance of such beliefs or values is questionable.  
The second part of the chapter explored three Constitutional Court cases which clearly 
demonstrate the predicament or conflict of rights arising from the influence of certain Christian 
values in South Africa post-1996. The explored cases are: Christian Education South Africa V 




Lange v Presiding Bishop of the Methodist Church of Southern Africa for the Time Being and 
Another The chapter exposed the arguments involved in the cases and the Constitutional 
Court’s judgements on the cases with regard to religious freedom and other related rights 
through which the concerned Christian institutions claim the right to influence society with 
their values.  
In Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education and Minister of Home Affairs and 
Another v Fourie and Another, the Constitutional Court strongly recognised the centrality of 
religious values both to believers and to society but ruled against religious claims. In De Lange 
v Presiding Bishop of the Methodist Church of Southern Africa for the Time Being and Another, 
the Constitutional Court affirmed its reluctance to interfere in issues relating to the regulation 
of religious values and beliefs, and thus referred Ms De Lange back to the arbitration process 
of the Methodist Church of South Africa according to rules and regulations of the Church. 
Although the three Constitutional Court Judgments are quite clear, the Court had to consider 
various conflicting and overlapping rights and freedoms in these issues. The cases demonstrate 
that given the unclarified parameters of religious freedom, how far Christian institutions can 
go in influencing society with their values is unclear. While attempting to deal with the 
predicament, the Constitutional Court may try to reconcile conflicting rights, consider the 
possibility of exemption and finally emphasise the centrality of democratic values of equality, 













CHAPTER THREE  
 
3. Religious Freedom and the Strategies in the South African Model 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
As shown in the three case studies explored in the previous chapter, Christian institutions claim 
the right to influence society with their values based on the Constitutional guarantees of 
religious freedom. Despite the explicit Constitutional stipulations of religious rights in Sections 
14(1), 15(2), 15(3), and 30(1), a question arises. What does freedom of religion really mean? 
It is one thing to look at the Constitutional stipulations of religious freedom, and it is quite a 
different thing to actually perceive the Constitutional guarantees of religious freedom from the 
perspective of case-law77 in South Africa. In that sense, religious freedom which is the basis 
for the influence of Christian values in South Africa has to be understood from both 
Constitutional guarantees and the Constitutional Court’s interpretation of what “the right to 
freedom of religion” and other related rights actually necessitate.  
To fully deal with the notion of religious freedom, this chapter categorises it into two 
dimensions; namely, internal aspect of religious freedom and external aspect of religious 
freedom with reference to the South African case-law and perspectives of key thinkers. 
Considering religious freedom from these perspectives is vital since this right in a broad way 
involves various freedoms which can be grouped into internal and external or private and public 
aspects. For example, the “right to freedom of religion” comprises “the freedoms of religious 
autonomy, religious choice, religious observance, propagation of a religion or denomination 
and religious teaching”78 (Van der Schyff 2005:195). As will be explored in this section, rights 
such as freedom of religious doctrines or beliefs can be considered as internal or private aspects 
of religious freedom while the practice or practical observance of such beliefs can be 
considered as external or public aspects.    
Understanding this fact requires not only looking at the three Constitutional Court cases 
explored in the previous chapter but also other selected cases which also attempt to clarify what 
freedom of religion involves. Based on the Constitutional guarantees of religious freedom and 
the importance of Christian values in South Africa, the Constitutional Court has been able to 
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deal with a number of cases whereby Christian values conflict with other Constitutional rights 
and fundamental values. The Constitutional Court has in some cases attempted to reconcile the 
influence of certain Christian values in society and the Constitutional rights which seem to be 
violated or infringed in the process of advocating such Christian values. In its attempt to deal 
with this predicament or clash or rights, three strategies can be identified. Firstly, there is what 
can be considered as the “positive recognition”79 of religious values which is characterised by 
the proportionality principle. Under this strategy, the Constitutional Court has in some cases 
attempted to reconcile Christian values with other rights and freedoms by balancing such rights. 
In so doing, the Constitutional Court has in some cases considered the possibility of 
accommodating Christian values based on their relevance in the society, importance to 
Christians and also Constitutional guarantees of religious freedom. For example, the 
Constitutional Court considered the possibility of granting accommodation in Minister of 
Home Affairs and Another v Fourie and Another although it did not in the final judgement.  
Secondly, the Constitutional Court considers, though not strongly, the principle of religious 
exemptions. In some Constitutional Court judgements, there have been clear indications that 
the Court does consider the possibility of granting Christian institutions special allowances to 
influence society with their values. In cases where Christian values infringe upon the rights of 
others, the Constitutional Court has been hesitant to grant exemptions despite the fact that such 
an option is evident in some cases. For example, in Christian Education South Africa v Minister 
of Education the Constitutional Court explored the possibility of granting a religious exemption 
but ended up affirming the impossibility of such a move.  
Finally, the Constitutional Court has also appealed to public reason in its attempt to reconcile 
or balance the influence of certain Christian values in society and the rights which they infringe. 
Here, two approaches to public reason are noted. Firstly, there is a subjective appeal to public 
reason whereby the Court recognises the values and convictions of everyone based on the 
notion of legal plurality. Christian values are recognised as vital to the Christian institutions 
concerned and to society. Based on the freedom of religious belief, Christian values are 
acknowledged and considered as essential. Secondly, an objective appeal to public reason can 
be identified in the South African case-law. In this context, the Constitutional Court considers 
the common interests or the generally applicable values and laws as being preeminent to 
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individual and religious values. The three strategies taken together highlight the way the 
judicial system deals with the predicament that arise when the influence of Christian values 
conflict with other values and rights.  
 
3.2 Religious Freedom in South African  
 
3.2.1 Internal Aspect of Religious Freedom  
 
The most primary element of religious freedom is its internal aspect since it stresses the liberty 
of an individual or religious institution or organisation to adhere to certain religious values 
freely and to maintain them. It entails the ability to choose what to believe. As Pretorius 
(2013:115) understands it, the internal aspect of religious freedom refers “to the freedom to 
believe, which embraces the freedom to choose one’s religion – religious or non-religious”. 
Due to the emphasis on the right of a religious institution or an individual to freely adopt certain 
beliefs and values, the internal aspect of religious liberty is underlined by the “inviolability of 
the individual's conscience” (Freedman 2000:105). From this perspective, Christian institutions 
in South Africa can claim to have the liberty to alter or adhere to certain beliefs which they 
perceive as acceptable and to use such beliefs as the basis for their influence in the society80.  
The internal aspect of religious freedom underlines religious autonomy and self-determinism81 
and is essential in guaranteeing the freedom of religious expression.  In that way, the right to 
“freedom of religious expression” is primarily based on the principle of religious autonomy. 
For Van der Schyff (2003:512), freedom of “religious autonomy refers to aspects of the 
relationship between the state and religion, as well as other institutional aspects of religion, 
such as the regulation of own affairs and doctrine, religious dignity”. Religious autonomy goes 
as far as giving Christian institutions the internal aspect of religious liberty. This means that 
Christian institutions have the right to regulate their beliefs and values which are within their 
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exercise clause was at the very least designed to guarantee freedom of conscience by preventing any degree of 
compulsion in matters of belief. It prohibited not only direct compulsion but also indirect coercion which might 
result from subtle discrimination; hence it was offended by any burden based specifically on one's religion. So 
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81 Section 235 of the South African Constitution on “Self-determination” states: “the right of the South African 
people as a whole to self-determination, as manifested in this Constitution, does not preclude, within the 
framework of this right, recognition of the notion of the right of self-determination of any community sharing a 
common cultural and language heritage, within a territorial entity in the Republic or in any other way, determined 
by national legislation”. This shows that Self-Determinism as an element of religious autonomy can be determined 




circles. Further, Christian values ought to be valued by the legal system as consisting of dignity 
and as appealing in their own respect. In that way, the “powers of domestic governance” (Van 
der Vyver 2012:149) of Christian institutions with regards to their values cannot be 
unjustifiably dismissed.  
From the highlighted perspective and based on Section 31(1) of the Bill of Rights, Christian 
institutions in South Africa have the right to regulate of beliefs and values in their own circles. 
In S v Lawrence, S v Negal,82 Justice Chaskalson P delivering Judgement on behalf of the 
majority asserted that “the essence of the concept of freedom of religion is the right to entertain 
such religious beliefs as a person chooses, the right to declare religious beliefs openly and 
without fear of hindrances or reprisal” (Rautenbach 2002:9-10)83. The internal aspect of the 
right to the freedom of religious belief in this case suggest that Christian institutions are given 
the opportunity and space to choose freely the belief or worldview to which they wish to adhere. 
As Kumalo (2013:636) remarks, South Africa’s post-1996 “observes the fact that its citizens 
are religious and allows them to practice their religions freely in public spaces without placing 
any limitations or biases on any particular religion”. 
The freedom of Christian institutions to regulate their own doctrines and values is emphasised 
by Section 31(1) of the Constitution which safeguards religious institutions and groups the right 
to control and practice their beliefs individually and collectively. The Constitutional Court 
considers religious convictions which citizens adhere to without unjustified reprisal. From this 
viewpoint, the internal aspect of the “right to freedom of religion” includes “an absence of 
coercion and constraint”84 given that “freedom of religion is impaired if people are forced to 
act in a manner contrary to their beliefs” (Freedman 2000:105)85. Christian institutions are at 
liberty to change or accept certain religious values or convictions without unnecessary 
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Section 15 of the Constitution was considered.  
83 The affirmed definition of religious freedom conforms to the definition upheld in R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd 
[(1985 18 DLR 4th), a Canadian case.  
84 In R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd [(1985 18 DLR 4th) (para.354)], Justice Dickson J declared: “if a person is 
compelled by the State or the will of another to a course of action or inaction which he would not otherwise have 
chosen, he is not acting of his own volition and he cannot be truly free. One of the major purposes of the Charter 
is to protect, within reason, from compulsion or restraint. Coercion includes not only such blatant forms of 
compulsion as direct commands to act or refrain from acting on pain of sanction, coercion includes indirect forms 
of control which determine and limit alternative courses of conduct available to others. Freedom in a broad sense 
embraces both the absence of coercions and constraint, and the right to manifest beliefs and practices”.  




intervention or coercion on the part of the judicial system or the state.  A particular Christian 
institution cannot be prevented from adopting certain beliefs which it finds appealing.  
The internal understanding of religious freedom is the cornerstone of other Constitutional rights 
related to religion highlighted in the first chapter. From this perspective, religious institutions 
pose the right to “require that their members be conformist and to exclude non-conformists” 
(Pistorius 2013:521). By implication, Christian institutions can determine certain regulations 
or rules which its adherents are required to abide in order to be affiliated to that religious 
institution. In Wittmann v Deutscher Schulverein, Pretoria and Others, Justice Van Dijkhosrt 
J noted that religious institutions are guaranteed the right to associate with those members who 
agree to the dictates of a religious organisation. Justice Van Dijkhosrt J stated that “freedom of 
association entails the right with others to exclude non-conformists. It also includes the right 
to require those who join the associations to conform with its principles and rules”86.  
From the above, Christian institutions, based on the freedom of religious belief and regulation 
“may exercise their freedom of autonomy in setting of guidelines for the admission of members 
to their organisations” (Pistorius 2013:525). A Christian institution may have its own views on 
certain issues relating to gender, abortion and so on which would be in some way binding on 
its members. This is because the internal aspect of religious freedom is central in regulating 
Christian values by concerned Christian institutions and fulfilling the demands of such 
institutions. A Christian institution regulates who qualifies to be a minister and who does not 
and has the liberty to suspend a member of its religious institution if such a member violates 
certain doctrinal principles.  
In De Lange v Presiding Bishop of the Methodist Church of Southern Africa for the Time Being 
and Another, the Methodist Church of South Africa argued in the Constitutional Court that Ms 
De Lange as a minister had an irrevocable mandate to be the custodian of the beliefs and values 
of the Church. As such, she was not to engage in a same-sex marriage based on Clause 4.82 of 
the Laws and Discipline of the Church. From the perspective of the internal aspect of religious 
freedom, such an argument is appealing given that the “sphere of sovereignty applies to the 
exercise of internal powers by, for example, a religious institution (an institutional right)” (van 
der Vyver 2012:163). In the case under consideration, the Constitutional Court acknowledged 
the need to respect the internal or private aspect of religious autonomy by avoiding intervening 
                                                          




in the matter of internal doctrinal issues of the Church. The Court suggested that the arbitration 
process based on the rules of the Church Community would be the most appropriate and 
primary platform to deal with the issue. Justice Moseneke DCJ representing the Court decision 
of the majority declared:  
Arbitration is the appropriate forum to decide if the line that has been drawn by the Church in 
Ms De Lange’s case is acceptable. It would not be appropriate for this Court to interfere at this 
stage especially considering that the line is close to the Church’s doctrines and values. No good 
reason has been shown why arbitration would not be suited to resolving the present dispute”.87  
The above shows that the internal aspect of religious freedom came out strongly in this 
Constitutional Court judgement. The Court clearly stated the inappropriateness of a situation 
whereby the legal system can intervene in private doctrinal issues of religious institutions. 
Through the internal aspect of religious freedom, religious institutions are at liberty to maintain, 
constitute and establish their own religious beliefs given that the Constitutional guarantee of 
freedom of religion involves the liberty to regulate its affairs. Pistorius (2013:524) reaffirms 
this argument by upholding that the “freedom to regulate doctrine is a necessary element in 
ensuring true freedom of religious autonomy as religious liberty can only come to full 
expression if churches are free to regulate their own doctrine and confessions”. This shows that 
the internal aspect of religious liberty is essential since it upholds the right of a Christian 
institution to respects its values.  
Nevertheless, the internal aspect of religious freedom was questioned, and to a greater extent 
limited in Strydom v Nederduitse Gereformeerde Gemeente Moreleta Park (Strydom case),88 
where the job appointment concerned did not directly involve the instruction of religious 
doctrine. In Strydom, the “court was called upon to decide whether it was permissible for a 
congregation to terminate the services of the head of its ‘art academy’ who openly entered into 
a gay relationship” (du Plessis 2009:31/360). Mr Johan Strydom, a music teacher who was 
head of the ‘art academy’ at Gemeente Moreleta Park congregation had his contract terminated 
by the Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk due to his involvement in a same-sex relationship. Mr 
Strydom contended in the Transvaal Provincial Division of the High Court of South Africa that 
he had been unfairly discriminated against based on his sexual orientation, and that the contract 
had not clearly stipulated that his duty extended to religious and doctrinal instruction.    
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On the contrary, the Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk maintained that the termination of the 
complainant’s contract was justifiable given that the church was acting in accord with its 
religious beliefs based on religious freedom as stipulated in the Constitution. On this basis, the 
church “insisted it had to ensure that people in leadership positions did not set a bad example. 
The church contended it could not be seen to condone the ‘sin’ of living in a homosexual 
relationship” (News24, 2008). In his judgement, Judge Dion Basson found that “the respondent 
unfairly discriminated against the complainant on the ground of his sexual orientation”.89  The 
court’s decision bears a certain impact on the internal aspect of religious freedom, to the extent 
that its absolute element can be restricted in certain cases. The discrimination of the 
Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk against Mr Strydom had a negative impact on his right to 
dignity and equality, and the church had unlawfully discriminated against him under the 
Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Discrimination Act. The judgement of the Strydom 
case appealingly shows that a limitation on the internal aspect of religious freedom might be 
plausible especially in cases of unfair discrimination of jobs that do not necessarily relate to 
the instruction of religious doctrine.  
The challenge with issues relating to moral conduct such as the question of same-sex marriage 
explored in De Lange v Presiding Bishop of the Methodist Church of Southern Africa is that 
they are not free from diverse opinions. This is especially the case in terms of its rightness or 
wrongness to the extent of being a defensible reason for determining membership or job 
opportunity in a Christian institution. Plausibly, Freitas (2012:1) argues that “appointments by 
(and membership to) a church may require an adherence to the core tenets of such a church, 
irrespective of the functions emanating from such an appointment”.  When a Christian 
institution employs a person in a position that is distant from its core beliefs or doctrines, so 
that the activity to be carried out by the employee does not entail a substantial relationship to 
its religious doctrines, then any form of work-related discrimination can be justifiably ruled 
out by the legal system. On the other hand, appointments relating to sacerdotal or ministerial 
positions and other “religiously based jobs”90 which have a closer “proximity to the doctrinal 
core”91 are examples where an employee might be dismissed by a religious institution.  
 
 
                                                          
89 Ibid., para 41(1). 
90 Lenta, P 2009. ‘Taking Diversity Seriously: Religious Associations and Work-related Discrimination’. South 
African Law Journal 126(4): 827-860. pp. 38.  




3.2.2 The External Aspect of Religious Freedom  
 
The internal aspect of religious freedom as asserted above showed that Christian institutions 
have a greater liberty to adhere to certain religious values and doctrines and to regulate internal 
affairs based on its doctrines. Reading the Constitution from the perspective of the internal 
aspect of religious freedom excludes the right of Christian institutions to influence the general 
public with their values. Such a right fall under the external aspect of religious practice since 
it concerns the expression or exercise of religious values. In that way, although the Courts are 
resistant to “embark upon an evaluation of the acceptability, logic, consistency or 
comprehensibility of …[religious] belief” (Van der Vyver 2012:161)92, where such beliefs 
conflict with other non-religious rights the Courts have had to intervene. How far religious 
values can go in influencing society through religious practice has been highly debatable in the 
legal system in South Africa.  
The European Court of Human Rights defines what can be considered as the external aspect of 
religious freedom as the “freedom to manifest one’s beliefs” (European Court of Human Rights 
Research Division, 2013:8). The external aspect of the “right to freedom of religion” in South 
Africa concerns the manifestation or practice of religious values or beliefs. This goes beyond 
religious autonomy since it does not only involve the regulation of certain religious values and 
its internal affairs. The external aspect of religious freedom involves a further aspect involving 
the practical application of such values both in private and public. As Justice Chaskalson P 
noted in S v Lawrence, “the essence of the concept of freedom of religion is… the right to 
manifest religious belief by worship and practice or by teaching and dissemination” 
(Rautenbach 2002:10). Through the external aspect of freedom of religion, Christian 
institutions attempt to influence the society with their values in South Africa.   
This is based on religious liberty which is guaranteed by the Constitution as consisting of both 
internal and external aspects of the right to freedom of religious belief and expression. This 
conforms with Coertzen (2011:11) who follows Blei in arguing that “religious freedom means 
more than just having a religion and upholding inner convictions and feelings” because it 
“includes the right of everybody to express his or her religion and faith in worship, teaching, 
practice, and maintenance.” Similarly, Mestry (2006:58) argues that the “right to freedom of 
religion” involves the “right to express one’s religious belief or philosophical convictions, both 
in private and in public, individually or jointly with others, freely in the form of teaching, 
                                                          




practice, worship and observances”. The internal and external aspects of religious freedom 
taken together underlie the not only the ability of Christian institutions to adhere to certain 
beliefs and regulate their values and affairs but also the actual observance and practice of 
religious values. This means that Christian institutions are free to practice their religious values 
in both private and public spheres. Christian institutions also have the liberty to influence 
society with religious values by either engaging actively with issues of public policy or 
enforcing their values on their constituencies and the general public.  
 
3.2.3 The Concept of Religious Freedom: Imbalanced? 
 
In the South African legal context93, the extent to which Christian values influence the society 
is indicated by the imbalance on how the freedom to hold religious values is separated from 
the freedom to practice or express them (Mofokeng 2007:121). Ideally, Constitutional 
provisions of religious freedom ought to protect both the regulation and practice of religious 
values and convictions in a way that is in accord to their choice. I uphold that Christian 
institutions ought also to be permitted to promote or practice Christian values both in religious 
circles and society. Following the place of Christian values in the society, such a distinction 
which has already been highlighted in the previous sections between religious belief and 
religious practice is essential. Although it has been noted that unlike the internal aspect of the 
right to religious freedom, the external aspect is not absolute in the sense that the state might 
intervene in limiting such freedom, it is apparent that the legal system in South African has 
been overemphasizing this fact. If a Christian institution has absolute freedom to uphold and 
regulate its values, why over-limit the manifestation or practice of such beliefs once they are 
used to influence the society?  
The emphasis on the practice aspect of religious freedom was acknowledged in S v Lawrence 
where the Court described freedom of religion as the “the right to entertain such religious 
beliefs as a person chooses the right to declare religious beliefs openly and without fear of 
hindrance or reprisal, and the right to manifest belief by worship and practice or by teaching 
and dissemination”94 (Mestry 2006:59). In that way, any laws or constraints that prohibit or 
restrict an individual or religious institution from adopting and manifesting religious values 
can be said to violate the “right of freedom of religion”. From this perspective, a Christian 
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institution can be said to have the freedom based on the Constitutional guarantees to uphold 
certain religious values both in belief and to practice them to the extent of influencing the 
society with such religious values.  Although the right to the freedom of religious belief is 
apparent in the legal systems in South Africa, the practice of such belief is questionable. 
Mofokeng (2007:121) argues:  
despite the fact that everyone has a right to freedom of religion under section 15 of the 
Constitution, the section does not adequately afford people the right to practise their religions 
freely, as people would understand that right. 
The state absolutely protects religious institutions to adhere to certain religious values though 
the application or practice of such values is not equally protected. Based on Constitutional 
guarantees of the right to freedom of religion, Christian institutions are free to regulate and 
practice their beliefs in a manner that is consistent with their values and religious principles. In 
Christian Education of South Africa v Minister of Education, Christian institutions opted to 
apply corporal punishment which they perceived as imperative to their religious values. It 
follows that if all parents who sent their children to such Christian institutions believe that 
corporal punishment is an essential Christian value which ought to be practiced by teachers, 
then the state ought to protect that element. Following Mofokeng, this is because religious 
convictions and their practical application cannot be separated since “belief leads to practice 
based on that belief” (2007:122). Mofokeng (2007:122) gives an example:  
if a man and a woman belong to X religion, they have a Constitutional right to believe in and 
belong to X religion, they may enter into a marriage in accordance with the rules of X religion. 
To marry in terms of X religion means that they actually put their religion into practice. 
However, if the marriage is in accordance with X religion, it may not be legally recognised in 
South Africa because it is not a civil marriage (that is, a marriage entered into in accordance 
with the provisions of the Marriage Act 25 of 1961).  
Mofokeng emphasises that for the “right to freedom of religion” to be fully realised, the legal 
system ought to treat equally both the freedom to hold certain values and practice them. Follow 
his indicated example, this would mean that a marriage conducted in accordance with religion 
X ought to be legally accepted, given that such a marriage is simply a manifesting of the right 
to ascribe to certain religious values. If both belief and practice were treated equally, then in 
the case of the Constitutional Court in Christian Education of South Africa v Minister of 
Education, Christian institutions would have to be allowed to practice their religious values in 
the concerned Christian schools. Given that the Constitutional Court judged against Christian 




but did not protect the practice or manifestation of such beliefs. Although one may be free to 
uphold any sort of religious values, I affirm that only those values which do not conflict with 
other Constitutional values and fundamental rights are fully guaranteed. Christian institutions 
can only influence society with values which do not infringe upon the rights and freedoms of 
others. Mofokeng (2007:124) perceives a problem in this case because “the distinction between 
the practice of one’s religion and the right of belief goes to the root of personal law”.  
Personal law as a vital component of the freedom to belief might be characterised as part of 
values which a Christian institution might consider binding and essential. With regards to 
Christian Education of South Africa v Minister of Education, Christian Education of South 
Africa considered corporal punishment part of their personal or private law. The defect in the 
Constitutional provisions is that they guarantee both the practice and belief aspects of personal 
law but only protect the latter. If the state only goes as far as protecting fully the right to 
freedom of belief and can overrule the practice of such beliefs, then one may argue that 
religious freedom is imbalanced. As Mofokeng (2007:124) puts it, “the right to freedom of 
religion in so far as the right to practise one’s religion is concerned, is rendered useless, because 
such a right is limited only to the protection “belief” which inseparable from the “practice” of 
that belief”. Can someone who belong to a particular Christian institution have the “right to 
freedom of religion’ provisioned by the Constitution if the practice of his or her religious belief 
or conviction is not legally protected or guaranteed? 
Internal and external aspects of religious freedom demand that a particular religious institution 
not only be allowed to regulate its beliefs but also that such beliefs be practised by adherents. 
Along the same lines, Pierre de Vos (Daily Maverick, 2012) affirms:   
Section 15(1) of the Constitution guarantees for everyone the right to ‘freedom of conscience, 
religion, thought, belief and opinion’. This means one has a right to believe what one wants to 
believe (no matter how bizarre, uninformed or harmful to others); to bring the good news of 
one’s beliefs to those around you by shouting it out from the rooftops; and by practicing the 
tenets of one’s religious beliefs. [Emphasis added in italic].  
Thus, when one talks of the right to freedom of religion, one argues that Christian institutions 
have the liberty of self-determination of religious precepts, have the freedom to practice such 
beliefs, and that they are given an opportunity to participate in the society with their values. 
That being the case, “section 15(1), read with sections 15(2) and 15(3), guarantee both the 
freedom of belief, and the freedom to practice that religion” (Mofokeng 2007:125). Section 




codifying religious laws or values which might be unconstitutional and the application of 
religious values or laws which infringe any Constitutional provisions. Section 15(3) and the 
limitation clause do not affect religious values or laws which are not contrary to any 
Constitutional stipulations. Nevertheless, for Mofokeng (2007:125), “the correct interpretation 
of section 15 is that freedom of religious belief and freedom to practise any law associated with 
any such religion or belief, should be regarded as protected in the Constitution”.  
From the above it can be argued that Christian values which are consistent with Constitutional 
principles are infringed by the judicial system. While analysing the developments in the 
Constitutional Court judgements as far as religious freedom is concerned, Mofokeng 
(2007:125) argues that the Courts do not protect both the belief and practice of religious values 
even if such values are in line with the Constitution. If Mofokeng’s interpretation of the right 
to religious freedom is plausible, one may question the reason why the Constitutional Court 
sometimes does not recognise the practice or influence of religious values in South Africa. 
Why did the Court not permit Christian institutions to employ corporal punishment to their 
schools in Christian Education of South Africa v Minister of Education? If the Court does not 
allow Christian institutions to employ corporal punishment in their institutions based on 
Section 15(3) following the limitation clause (Section 36), then one may assert that the 
manifestation or practice of religious values are not fully protected in the South Africa case-
law. In that regard, Mofokeng (2007:130) argues:  
the courts have failed to protect the right of different peoples to practise their religion by not 
recognising that the right to freedom of religion includes not only the mental aspects of belief, 
but also freedom to practise and have legal protection of the rules of their religion.  
To balance the internal and external aspects of religious freedom, the realisation on the part of 
the Courts that the “right to freedom of religion” and all other Constitutional provisions 
associated with it entails holding to a particular belief system and its application. The argument 
at hand is that the state ought to protect equally the freedom of Christian institutions to hold 
religious values and to manifest or practice them in the society to the extent of engaging with 








3.2.4 The External Aspect of Religious Freedom as Limited  
 
In Christian Education of South Africa v Minister of Education, Justice Liebenberg highlighted 
that under normal circumstances the Court may not intervene in doctrinal issues of Christian 
institutions by determining the soundness or logic or religious beliefs95. According to Currie 
(2013:341), Justice Liebenberg in Christian Education of South Africa v Minister of Education 
observed that:  
in cases of this nature a court will in the first place consider whether the beliefs relied upon in 
fact forms part of the religious doctrine of the religion practiced by the person concerned. Once 
it is found that the belief does form part of that doctrine, the court will not embark upon an 
evaluation of the acceptability, logic, consistency or comprehensibility of that belief. But the 
Court will then inquire into the sincerity of the person’s claim that a conflict exists between the 
legislation and the belief which is indeed burdensome to the person [emphasis added in italic].  
Based on the highlighted judicial sentiment, the logical essence of Christian values may not be 
considered by the legal system. If the judicial system can do so, then the right of Christian 
institutions to adhere to certain values based on their ‘right to freedom of religion’ is defeated. 
From this perspective, Martinez-Torron (2003:3) is justified in considering the internal 
dimension of the “right to freedom of religion” as absolute to a greater extent. However, 
limitations may not be made against the liberty of a particular Christian institution in terms of 
the regulation of its own values and affairs especially in cases that directly have to do with the 
appointment of religious leaders. The case would be slightly different in situations that deal 
with employment that is distant from doctrinal application and regulation such as employing a 
music teacher as in the Strydom case where the discrimination based on sexual orientation was 
overruled.96 Nevertheless, this does not imply that religious institutions and organisations 
cannot be granted a significant degree of autonomy in matters of doctrinal regulation including 
their employment practices.  
The court may not interfere with the internal affairs of religious groups especially in cases that 
deal primarily with religious education or the imparting of doctrine such as a priestly position. 
For instance, the ability of a religious organisation to ordain a minister would entail that the 
one who is to be ordained must abide by the requisite doctrinal stipulations and disciplinary 
proceedings of the concerned religious institution as was the case in De Lange v Presiding 
Bishop of the Methodist Church of Southern Africa. However, the case would be different in a 
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situation where a religious organisation grants a person a job which is more distant from the 
doctrinal core of the religious group. In this case, the religious group cannot be granted absolute 
autonomy in its internal dealings to the extent of discriminating against an employee on the 
grounds of sexual orientation, especially if such a position is not ministerial and does not entail 
religious instruction. 
In a democratic and pluralistic society, religious values cannot be unfairly ridiculed or curtailed 
as long as they are exercised in a manner consistent with the Constitutional values in its 
practice.  Based on the Constitutional guarantees of freedom of religion discussed in the first 
chapter, the state grants Christian institutions protection given to other non-religious rights. 
Wherever the question of the right to religious freedom arises, one may question how far the 
influence of certain Christian values can go in the public sphere based on the internal and 
external aspects of the concept of religious freedom. This affirms the relevance of the 
Constitutional limitations on religious freedom. Pistorius (2013:525) highlights that: 
 the forum externum97 dimension contrary to the forum internum98 is not absolute and the 
practices and rituals of religion, whether physical or emotional, need to be exercised in such a 
way that they are not inconsistent with the specific provisions of religious freedom or with the 
other basic human rights contained in the Bill of Rights.  
Pistorius’s argument is in line with Freedman (2000:107-108) who argues that “while the 
freedom to adopt a belief would appear to be an absolute right, the freedom to manifest those 
beliefs in practice must be subject to limitation”. While the internal aspect of freedom of 
religion has to do with beliefs and their private regulation, the practice of such beliefs both 
privately and publicly affects other citizens who might adhere to deferent values or convictions. 
This is because it is through the external aspect of religious beliefs that Christian values 
manifest to the extent of influencing the society. In this regards, the limitation of religious 
beliefs has been apparent in South African case-law as evident in cases such as Christian 
Education South Africa v Minister of Education and Minister of Home Affairs and Another v 
Fourie and Another. 
As shown in the previous chapter, in both mentioned cases the Constitutional Court curtailed 
the influence of Christian values in society by ruling against arguments presented by the 
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concerned religious institutions. However, in both cases the Constitution Court quite clearly 
emphasised the relevance and importance of Christian values both to Christians themselves 
and society. The same was the state of affairs in Prince V President of the Law Society of the 
Cape and others.99 In this case, the Court found that unlike the freedom to religious belief, the 
notion of religious practice was not absolute given that Court’s interests in restricting the use 
of a potentially harmful drug in line with the common good and international regulations 
precede the interests of the Rastafari to possess and use such drugs through religious practice100. 
 
3.3 Three Strategies in the South African Model  
 
3.3.1 Reconciling Christian Values with the ‘Other’  
 
A closer look at the South African case-law show that in cases where certain Christian values 
conflict with other Constitutionally guaranteed rights, the Constitutional Court attempt to 
reconcile or find a balance between the two. South African Courts employ “the proportionality 
principle” or proportional analysis (Pienaar 2003:127) which is based on the “positive 
recognition model” (Bilchitz 2012:14).  The model involves the balancing of rights based on 
the fact that the state recognises the rights and values of all citizens and attempt to reconcile 
them in cases where different Constitutionally protected rights conflict or clash. According to 
Bilchitz (2012:14), a “positive recognition model” is vital in “defining the importance of 
religion in many people's lives and seeks to find a manner in which the state can, in a positive 
and egalitarian manner, recognise the varied identities of its citizens”.  
The model of “positive recognition” captures the important relationship between religion and 
the state. The model is “rooted in the idea of the equal worth of individuals across their 
differences” (Bilchitz 2012:170). The state through legal systems ought to create conditions 
whereby religious institutions can express their identities and beliefs. Given that the affirmed 
rules out the strict separation between state and religion, certain values of religious institutions 
may be permitted to penetrate the public sphere as long as essential rights are not violated in 
the process. Central to the model is the equal recognition and treatment of both religious and 
non-religious values or the “the equal positive recognition of all differing identities”.101  
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Using the “positive recognition model,” one can justify the place of certain Christian values in 
the society should they not violate the rights or freedom of the other. By balancing the influence 
of Christian values in society and other Constitutional rights and values that are violated by 
such an influence, the Court is said to employ proportionality analysis. As Coertzen (2010:12-
13) highlights, balancing religious rights with other equally protected Constitutional values is 
based on the ability of the Court to find the proportionality between: 
 
the fundamental rights of equality, human dignity, and non-discrimination on the one hand and 
the associational rights, which includes the freedom of association, freedom of religion, 
freedom of practice and use one’s language and culture and the right to associate in cultural, 
religious and linguistic communities, on the other hand.  
If the Court restricts the influence of certain Christian values, then this ought to be based on 
the legitimate and proportionate ground rooted in the values and spirit of the Constitution. In 
that sense, the Constitutional Court is accommodationist. As Pierre de Vos (Daily Maverick, 
2012) points out, “Courts have said that they will apply the principle of reasonable 
accommodation when balancing competing interests of the state and of religious communities”. 
Such accommodation depends on the influence of Christian values in both the private and 
public sphere based on religious freedom and other related rights. As highlighted in the first 
chapter, Christian institutions are guaranteed the freedom to exercise their religious values102, 
the freedom of religious association and assembly103 and the freedom to religious autonomy104 
as legal bodies105. As Van der Vyver (2012:157) asserts, “the Constitutional Court, on several 
occasions, emphasised the vital importance of the state of religion as a component of South 
Africa’s Constitutional democracy”. Delivering a unanimous Court decision in Minister of 
Home Affairs and Another v Fourie and Another, Justice Albie Sachs made an important 
remark on the importance of religion in South Africa:  
Religious bodies play a large and important part in public life, through schools, hospitals and 
poverty relief programmes. They command ethical behaviour from their members and bear 
witness to the exercise of power by State and private agencies; they promote music, art and 
theatre; they provide halls for community activities, and conduct a great variety of social 
activities for their members and the general public. They are part of the fabric of public life, 
and constitute active elements of the diverse and pluralistic nation contemplated by the 
Constitution. Religion is not just a question of belief or doctrine. It is part of the people’s temper 
and culture, and for many believers a significant part of their way of life. Religious 
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organizations constitute important sectors of national life and accordingly have a right to 
express themselves to government and the courts on the great issues of the day. They are active 
participants in public affairs fully entitled to have their say with regard to the way law is made 
and applied.  
The above sentiments show the equality of secular and religious values before legal systems. 
In its attempt to accommodate and tolerate differing rights or freedoms, Pienaar (2003:119) 
argues that the Constitutional Court uses the principles of “equality and human dignity”. From 
this perspective, the South African legal system can be said to uphold “the even-handed 
treatment of diverse religions and of religious groups, communities, and institutions with 
potentially conflicting interests” (du Plessis 2001:450). The influence of Christian institutions 
through religious practice based on religious freedom are weighed against fundamental 
Constitutional rights such as non-discrimination, equality and human dignity. This is in line 
with the limitation clause whereby religious freedom may be limited “to the extent that the 
limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom”106.  
The South African legal model advocates the elements of non-discrimination and equality 
before the law, whereby religious values and their influence in the society cannot be unfairly 
segregated. As Van der Vyver (2012:158) puts it, “equal protection and non-discrimination 
constitute the most basic norm of the South African Constitutional dispensation, and unfair 
discriminatory practices”. The equality principle shows why case-law in post-1996 South 
Africa has been that of accommodative in some instances. In 2000, the Promotion of Equality 
and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 was promulgated to strengthen the Equality 
principle which states that “everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal 
protection and benefit of the law”107. This entails that in reconciling Christian values with other 
Constitutional rights which might be unfairly infringed through the influence of certain 
Christian values, the Court in upholding the principles of “an open and democratic society” 
will have to consider principles such as human dignity, fairness, equality, freedom and 
justice108. In that sense, “equality legislation” (Pienaar 2003:122) is promoted in South Africa.  
On the basis of equality and the Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, Christian 
institutions are permitted like any other organisations to participate in issues of public policy 
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with their values. What might be problematic would be how to determine circumstances where 
their influence is fairly or unfairly discriminatory. If a complaint of unfair discrimination is 
brought forward against a Christian institution by an appellant, the particular religious 
institution will be given an opportunity by the Court to demonstrate how the affirmed complaint 
did not unfairly discriminate against any of the Constitutional rights of the appellant. The 
religious institution will have to show that the supposed discriminatory act was not based on 
Constitutionally “prohibited grounds”109 but that it was based on fair grounds. In Harksen v 
Lane NO and Others,110 the Constitutional principles of equality and non-discrimination which 
underlie the accommodative feature of Courts were tested. According to Pienaar (2003:122), 
the procedure in Harksen v Lane NO and Others, was as follows: 
 The applicant has to prove that discrimination on any of the grounds prohibited in section 9 of 
the Constitution took place, whereupon the presumption of unfair discrimination may be 
rebutted by the respondent. Where the discrimination is based on any other ground that causes 
or perpetuates systemic disadvantage, undermines human dignity or adversely affects the equal 
enjoyment of a person’s rights and freedoms in a serious manner,9 section 13(2)(b) stipulates 
that such discrimination is unfair, unless the respondent proves that it is fair.  
 
The right to non-discrimination and equality are central when the Courts attempt to reconcile 
or balance religious rights with other rights that might be infringed upon in the process. The 
Constitutional guarantees of religious values are viewed in line with other equally 
Constitutionally protected rights and freedom. In Christian Education South Africa v Minister 
of Education, values such as human dignity were deemed more paramount than the Christian 
value of corporal punishment. In this case, having reconciled various conflicting rights, the 
Court upheld the rights to human security and dignity in line with Sections 10 and 12(1) of the 
Constitution which they perceived as fundamental that corporal punishment had violated. This 
conforms with Pienaar (2003:126) who asserts that “the unanimous decision of the 
Constitutional court in the Christian Education case was primarily based on effectuating 
equality through the balancing effect of the Constitutional value of the protection of human 
dignity”.  
The “competing” and “overlapping” interests and Constitutional values in the case shows how 
much fundamental values of freedom, equality and human dignity are implicated where the 
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influence of Christian values conflict with other Constitutional rights111. However, after 
balancing and reconciling different interests and values in question equitably based on the 
principle of human dignity, it was apparent that “the ban on corporal punishment formed part 
of a legislative scheme designed to establish uniform educational standards” (Pienaar 
2003:127). Christian Education South Africa perceived the final pronouncements on the case 
as a discrimination against Christian values grounded on the Constitutional rights related to 
religious freedom. Rautenbach (2002:15) suggests that according to Freedman, “the state must 
be able to limit those practices, whether religious or not, which endanger the life and health of 
others or which limit the rights of others or which create public disturbances or undermine 
public morals”. Freedman emphasises the limitation of the influence religious values where 
they contravene the rights or freedoms of the other. 
However, I perceive Freedman’s position as complex because it requires first and foremost the 
ability of the Courts to “strike a balance between religious liberty and the state’s duty to 
legislate for the common good” (Rautenbach 2002:15). Such a balance requires that the 
Constitutional Court channel the influence of Christian values in the society in line with other 
rights. In the three case studies explored in the previous chapter, one notices that Christian 
institutions attempt to influence the society with their values based on the Constitutional 
guarantees of religious belief and practice. Such institutions claim outright recognition of their 
values which they deem viable both from a religious and Constitutional perspective. On the 
other hand, the Constitutional Court recognises its duty to protect not only religious rights with 
regards to both belief and practice, but also non-religious rights which are claimed to have been 
violated by the influence of Christian values in each case.  
In Prince v President of the Law Society of the Cape and others 112 where the Court upheld that 
“the Constitution does not call for different levels of scrutiny, but expressly contemplates the 
use of a nuanced and context-sensitive form of balancing in the s 36 proportionality analysis”. 
In this case, having balanced and reconciled different values and rights, the Court affirmed that 
the prohibition of the use of cannabis was the most appealing option since it exceeded the 
interests of the Rastafari community to practice the use of cannabis and that such a prohibition 
was for the common good of the general public113. The ability of the Constitutional Court to 
recognise the relevance of religious values indicates that “the Constitutional Court approaches 
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matters relating to religious freedom with sensitivity and understanding” (Mestry 2006:60). 
Nevertheless, the influence of Christian values in the public sphere may not be unfairly limited, 
but have to perceived from the perspective of other equally protected rights and freedoms 
especially human dignity and equality. In the Court’s attempt to balance or reconcile the 
influence of certain Christian values and the ‘other’ based on the discrimination claim, Pienaar 
(2003:129) argues: 
in the case of discrimination based on a prohibition on the exercise of religious practices, the 
burden rests on the respondent to proof that a distinction is based on acknowledged church 
dogma or religious beliefs, and is of such a nature that it passes the test of a nuanced and 
context-sensitive form of balancing of these rights and the equality of affected persons.  
In order to balance Christian values which might conflict with other rights which might be 
infringed or unfairly discriminated by Christian values, a concerned Christian institution in the 
Court of law ought to show that the discrimination is fair both on the grounds of the concerned 
Constitutional rights and fundamental values of freedom, human dignity and equality. In De 
Lange v Presiding Bishop of the Methodist Church of Southern, a strict balancing and 
reconciling of Christian Constitutional rights based on the internal aspect of religious liberty 
and sexual orientation made the Court refer the appellant back to the arbitration process of the 
Methodist Church. This was not the outcome in Christian Education South Africa v Minister 
of Education where the value of human dignity was upheld and in the Prince V President case 
where the interests of the community outplayed those of the Rastafarian community to use 
potentially harmful drugs. In line with that, Pierre de Vos (Daily Maverick, 2012) remarks:  
when a court is called upon to make a decision on whether such limitations are reasonable and 
justifiable in terms of the limitation clause provided in section 36 of the Bill of Rights, it will 
have to balance the interests of the state and the community as a whole (including the interests 
of women and gay men and lesbians), on the one hand, against the interests of the religious 
community whose beliefs, teachings and practices are being limited, on the other.  
The balancing of conflicting rights highlighted by Pierre de Vos depends on how much damage 
is caused or discriminatory a case is. Suppose that the case causes serious harm to the extent 
of violating the principle of human dignity, then the Court might be more robust in limiting the 
influence of the concerned Christian values in the society114. If the influence of Christian values 
is positive and in line with the Constitutional stipulations and values, then the Court will be 
less likely to issue bans on Christian values and influence in society. The “right to freedom of 
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religion” is “a civil right and, therefore, the state should not advance nor inhibit religion but 
rather assume a position of fairness” Mestry (2006:58).  
The Courts attempt to obtain a neutral stance in weighing religious rights against other rights 
which might be threatened by the influence of Christian values arising from the former. 
Recognising this duty, in Minister of Home Affairs and Another v Fourie and Another, the 
Court highlighted that “the hallmark of an open and democratic society is its capacity to 
accommodate and manage difference of intensely-held world views and lifestyles in a 
reasonable and fair manner”115. The bitter pill for the Courts to swallow is just how far the 
influence of certain Christian values can be accommodated in society. This is especially 
difficult given that certain Christian values and practices might be harmful or considered as 
discriminatory. Based on this, in most cases balancing or reconciling such an influence with 
other rights that are violated has been the norm.  
 
3.3.2 Religious Exemptions 
 
The question of exemptions in terms of granting some Christian institutions special respect and 
exceptions from generally applicable laws and moral norms is quite interesting in South 
African case-law. This raises the question of whether certain Christian institutions should be 
given exemptions or allowances should the influence of their values infringe upon the rights of 
others. The claim for exemptions might be based on the centrality of certain religious values to 
the life of a religious group, institution or individual or simply that a certain set of religious 
values deserves special respect to the extent of allowances or exemptions being sought. Such 
exemption involves being granted a special allowance to uphold certain practices, actions or 
beliefs which might be somewhat contrary to the general norm, but are nonetheless free from 
prohibition or are at least given an opportunity to exist.  
The notion of exemption is linked to the principle of toleration which according to Leiter 
(2012:8) involve the fact that “one group must deem another differing group’s beliefs or 
practices ‘wrong, mistaken, or undesirable’ and yet ‘put up’ with them nonetheless”. From this 
perspective, religious exemption occurs when the judicial system tolerates the practices or 
influence of certain religious values by granting them special protection and freedom. For 
example, a Christian institution might have certain values which are contradictory to the 
                                                          




Constitutional values, and which may infringe or violate other Constitutionally protected 
rights. Nevertheless, the Court might opt to grant such an institution a special exemption to 
practice and advocate such values in the society. This might occur when the Court cannot 
balance or reconcile the influence of certain religious values and other Constitutional rights 
that are violated in the process.  
 
3.3.2.1 Exempting Christian Values    
 
In South Africa, Christian values are often treated as being equal to other Constitutional rights 
by the judicial systems, and religious convictions are considered part of the many liberties or 
human rights which are protected. As highlighted in the previous section, where religious 
freedom conflicts or collides with non-religious values, the state grants an equal limit of 
freedom, whereby one liberty may not override others. The stated position might be challenging 
because certain religious beliefs and values used by some Christian institutions in their attempt 
to influence the society are imperative in character. For example, Leiter (2012:36) notes that 
religious beliefs are sometimes regarded as obligatory, and beliefs in theories such as eternal 
damnation may force religious people to uphold certain values regardless of the consequences.  
The stressed element does not arise when Christian values and practices in question do not 
conflict with other equally protected Constitutional values. It arises when the values enacted 
by Christian groups clash with other rights and freedoms.  
Religious values which might sometimes be understood as absolute make religious liberty non-
negotiable and absolute to the extent of violating other liberties. This is clear in Christian 
Education South Africa v Minister of Education and Minister of Home Affairs and Another v 
Fourie and Another where religious values and their influence in the society infringed upon 
the rights of a third party and had to be curtained by the Constitutional Court. Where the Court 
cannot balance or reconcile religious values with other rights without placing a limit on the 
influence of certain Christian values, a question arises. This concerns “whether religious 
claimants are ever entitled as a matter of right to exemptions from laws of general application” 
(Lenta 2012:303). Should the Court grant Christian institutions exemptions to adhere to 
religious values and practices that might be intolerable under normal circumstances and that 
are contradictory to the Constitutional values? Lenta (2009:37) considers the Christian 
Education South Africa v Minister of Education as “the first occasion in which the Court dealt 
with a claim for a religious exemption”. In this case, the significance of religion was explained 




for many believers, their relationship with God or creation is central to all their activities. It 
concerns their capacity to relate in an intensely meaningful fashion to their sense of themselves, 
their community and their universe. For millions in all walks of life, religion provides support 
and nurture and a framework for individual and social stability and growth. Religious belief has 
the capacity to awake concepts of self-worth and human dignity which form the cornerstone of 
human rights. It affects the believer’s view of society and founds the distinction between right 
and wrong. It expresses itself in the affirmation and continuity of powerful traditions that 
frequently have an ancient character transcending historical epochs and national boundaries.116  
The Court asserted how fundamental religious values are in society. Christian values provide 
a distinct setting for identity exploration and commitment through giving ideological, social, 
spiritual and political backing to many citizens117. Through its beliefs and practices, religion 
defines many people, giving them a sense of belonging and identity. Further, reasons that are 
given for ever considering religious exemptions are that religion imparts good moral principles 
and identity, contributes to the common good and welfare and that religious beliefs are 
categorical. Based on the centrality of religion, Judge Sachs in Christian Education South 
Africa V Minister of Education, held that “the state should, wherever reasonably possible, seek 
to avoid putting believers to extremely painful and intensely burdensome choices of either 
being true to their faith or else respectful of the law”118.  
The Court noticed a situation that might occur when religious or religiously motivated 
enthusiasts face a difficult dilemma of choosing either to follow the law of the state or their 
deeply religious convictions and religiously inspired categorical values. Such a predicament 
might make Christian institutions seek special toleration or exemptions. In line with this, du 
Plessis (2001:450) argues:  
Tolerance of religious diversity goes beyond putting up with the free exercise of divergent 
religious beliefs and practices. It also entails the even-handed treatment of diverse religions and 
of religious groups, communities, and institutions with potentially conflicting interests.   
The basis of granting toleration in terms of an exemption is the argument that Christian 
institutions intrinsically deserve special respect based on the Constitutional guarantees of 
religious freedom and that their views are central to Christian identity. However, given that 
“religious freedom is neither the only Constitutionally guaranteed liberty nor the highest one” 
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(Grimm 2009:2375), the influence of Christian values ought not to do harm or violate other 
rights and freedoms protected by the Constitution. In deciding the case for exemption in South 
African, the Court discerns whether granting an exemption for corporal punishment to continue 
being exercised in the concerned Christian institutions would infringe other equally appealing 
Constitutional values. This would be beyond accommodation and requires the possibility of an 
exemption because:  
the proportionality exercise has to relate to whether the failure to accommodate the appellant’s 
religious belief and practice by means of the exemption for which the appellant asked, can be 
accepted as reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, freedom and equality.119  
When dealing with a case for exemption, the Courts consider not only the rights that are 
involved but also other essential principles of equality and human dignity. Christian values are 
equal and part of other Constitutional rights and liberties which ought to be protected by the 
Constitution. According to Lenta (2007:38), “in Christian Education, Judge Sachs dispensed 
with an objection that the principle of equality precluded the granting of exceptions”. Based on 
the equality concern, in dispensing the appeal for exemption in Christian Education South 
Africa V Minister of Education, Judge Sachs held that “the essence of equality lies not in 
treating everyone in the same way, but in treating everyone with equal concern and respect”120.  
 
From the asserted perspective, the Constitutional Court in some cases attempts to refrain from 
unfairly granting a religious institution preferential treatment while leaving out others who 
might also deserve the same exemption. As the Court declared in Minister of Home Affairs and 
Another v Fourie and Another, “it is one thing for the Court to acknowledge the important role 
that religion plays in our public life…it would be out of order to employ the religious 
sentiments of some as a guide to the Constitutional rights of others”.121 The South African 
Courts are not ready to grant exemptions in cases that would infringe upon the rights of a third 
party. Such a problem does not arise in situations where the influence of certain Christian 
values do not conflict or clash with other Constitutional rights or general laws.  
In Prince v President of the Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope and Others, the Court 
considered the possibility of granting an exemption on religious grounds. In this case, Prince 
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appealed to the Constitutional Court to declare Article 22A (10) of the Medicines Act and 
Article 4(b) of the Drugs Act unconstitutional on the basis that they discriminate against 
Rastafarians from using cannabis for religious purposes. The appellant contended that his right 
to religious observance or practice through the use of cannabis had been unfairly limited. 
Justice Ngcobo J highlighted:  
should the Court find that any of these provisions limit the rights to religious freedom, one of 
the key questions which will have to be decided is whether a religious exemption to Rastafari 
would undermine the government’s efforts to fight drug abuse and trafficking. In particular, the 
Court will have to decide whether there will be practical difficulties in policing such 




3.3.3 The Appeal to Public Reason  
 
3.3.3.1 Public Reason Model  
 
Public reason is an essential feature of a democratic society given that it underlines how people 
relate to each other in a pluralistic society. In South Africa, people are free to abide by their 
own convictions based on their liberty of conscience without being necessarily coerced to 
uphold someone else’s beliefs or opinions. At the same time, citizens are expected to respect 
the beliefs and convictions of others, whether religious, political or moral. This freedom affirms 
the idea that individuals (or groups) are given the opportunity and the means to choose freely 
the belief or opinions to which they wish to adhere and the space in which to apply or practice 
it. This reaffirms a juridical framework which advocates legal plurality where a diversity of 
ideas and convictions flourishes. Based on the social diversity as the basis of the legal structure, 
Griffiths (1986:38-39) defines legal pluralism as: 
the normative heterogeneity attendant upon the fact that social action always takes place in a 
context of multiple, overlapping ‘semi-autonomous social fields’ [a] situation of legal pluralism 
…is one in which law and legal institution are not all subsumable within one ‘system’ but have 
their sources in the self-regulatory activities of all multifarious social fields present, activities 
which may support, complement, ignore or frustrate one another.  
Legal pluralism is an essential component of the South African law especially because the 
Constitution recognises the right to freedom of belief and religion. The state cannot allow one 
group to freely express a certain practice and disapprove of another from expressing the same 
                                                          




practice. Nevertheless, although members of the society enjoy the liberty of their varying 
convictions and beliefs, there are certain regulations or stipulations which are generally 
applicable. From this perceptive, Quong (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2016) defines 
public reason as “those rules we sincerely believe can be justified by appeal to suitably shared 
or public considerations—for example, widely endorsed political values such as freedom and 
equality”. A closer look at South African case-law show that the pluralistic stance of the 
Constitution has given rise to contradictions among values.  
Due to the irreconcilable nature of varying Constitutional values and rights, it is difficult to 
attain a consensus in some cases. Therefore, there is a need to come to terms with various 
reasons that may reasonably be applied should certain controversial issues of conflicting rights 
obtain. According to Rawls (1997:765), public reason “specifies at the deepest level the basic 
moral and political values that are to determine a Constitutional democratic government's 
relation to its citizens and their relation to one another”. Public reason demands that beliefs and 
convictions held by individuals or institutions be compatible with the Constitutional principles 
of human dignity, freedom and equality which underlie public reason in the Constitutional 
spirit. This is because “the basic requirement is that a reasonable doctrine accepts a 
Constitutional democratic regime and its companion idea of legitimate law” (Rawls 1997:765).   
 
3.3.3.2 The Subjective Appeal to Public Reason 
 
The Constitutional Court advocates an appeal to “public reason” (Rawls 1993:212-54) in 
extreme cases where the influence of certain values infringes upon the rights of a third party or 
on other Constitutional values. As highlighted, the Court avoids judging the reasonableness or 
consistency of religious values and beliefs. In the three case studies explored in the previous 
chapter, Christian institutions concerned justified the influence of religious values in society 
based on their stance on religious grounds and also on the Constitutional right to freedom of 
religion. Such a subjective appeal to public reason would require us “to address each person’s 
point of view” (Dorfman 2008:289) or to acknowledge the significance of different views in 
society. This conforms to Waldron’s (1987:149) stance that, “liberals demand that social order 
should in principle be capable of explaining itself at the tribunal of each person’s 
understanding”. This means that based on the principle of equality, different values and rights 




However, the subjective appeal to public reason does not actually entail that the Courts accept 
the beliefs of everyone, but that the judicial system reasonably recognises the relevance of 
religious and non-religious values which are already Constitutionally protected. In so doing, 
the state is able to reach out to the belief systems or point of view of every citizen through 
which all reasonable citizens, religious or not are recognised. This is clear in De Lange v 
Presiding Bishop of the Methodist Church of Southern Africa where the Constitutional Court 
referred Ms De Lange back to the arbitration process of the Methodist Church of Southern 
Africa. This shows that the reasonableness of the rule regulated by the Methodist Church 
forbidding same-sex marriage for an ordained Minister based on doctrinal and biblical 
principles is justifiable. Their stance is based on reasons that require a Constitutional reading 
of religious freedom and not an examination of such values on the basis of their reasonableness.  
In the three case studies, the Christian institutions required that the Constitutional Court to 
judge not on the basis of public evidence, but on the Constitutionality of such beliefs, to the 
extent of being granted exemptions. For example, in Minister of Home Affairs and Another v 
Fourie and Another, the Marriage Alliance of South Africa argued that same-sex marriages are 
forbidden on Christian grounds. The Marriage Alliance also maintained that religious 
institutions based on their freedom of religion are permitted disavow such marriages. The 
Marriage Alliance of South Africa did not argue that the unacceptability of same-sex marriage 
is based on common reason, such that even if such a belief would be subjected to public reason, 
the belief would remain unshaken.  In this case, they are not appealing “to a common reason 
which is available to everyone and which can be invoked on behalf of everyone even though 
not everyone interprets its results in the same way” (Nagel 1987:235).  
In post-1996 democratic South Africa, everyone is constitutionally guaranteed to base his or 
her convictions or values on foundations other than public reason. Although certain Christian 
values seem unreasonable if weighed against public reason, they may be reasonable in their 
own respect such as in the sense that they contain authority attached to a Supreme Being and 
given that they are constitutionally protected. This subjective appeal to public reason is based 
on legal plurality in South Africa as reaffirmed by Justice Sachs J in Minister of Home Affairs 
and Another v Fourie and Another: 
The acknowledgement and acceptance of difference is particularly important in our country 
where for centuries group membership based on supposed biological characteristics such as 
skin colour has been the express basis of advantage and disadvantage. South Africans come in 




a common citizenship depends on recognising and accepting people with all their differences, 
as they are.71 The Constitution thus acknowledges the variability of human beings (genetic and 
socio-cultural), affirms the right to be different, and celebrates the diversity of the nation123  
The above quote emphasises the appropriateness of all belief systems and values which are 
subjectively considered as appealing by reasonable citizens. Christian values which are 
incompatible with public reason and cannot validate their reasonableness publicly and which 
others are not allowed to weigh their sensibleness in line with public reason are what Meyerson 
(1997:16) calls “intractable” beliefs. For Meyerson (1997:17), public reason is neutral and 
independent of “particular intractable disputed religious views and those views own internal 
standards of justification”. Intractable values are those that are subjective and cannot be 
exposed to an objective appeal to public reason. In the three case studies explored in the 
previous chapter, Christian institutions appealed not because their views can be publicly proven 
to be reasonable, but based on the fact that they consider such values as central to their beliefs 
and that they are given liberty to hold such beliefs by the Constitution. In Minister of Home 
Affairs and Another v Fourie and Another, the Court affirmed:  
the objective of the Constitution is to allow different concepts about the nature of human 
existence to inhabit the same public realm, and to do so in a manner that is not mutually 
destructive and that at the same time enables government to function in a way that shows equal 
concern and respect for all.124  
From the stated perspective, South African Courts in some instances regard everybody’s 
reasons for holding a certain values as equal. In cases where the Constitutional Court limits 
certain religious values which are protected by the Constitution, then it has a sole duty of 
justifying such a limitation. In line with this sentiment, Meyerson (1997:17) argues:  
if the reasons supplied by the state for limiting a Constitutionally protected right have to be 
such as to elicit the agreement of all reasonable citizens who matter equally, then any proposed 
justification will have to be framed in terms which each reasonable citizen would affirm as 
reasonable and justified from his or her own point of view.   
Because of its respect of all constitutionally protected rights and freedom, the state is bound to 
take seriously all subjective values and beliefs. This is apparent in the Constitutional reading 
of religious values and the extent of their influence in the society. When limiting the influence 
of Christian values in the society in line with the values of the open and democratic 
Constitution, the Constitutional Court recognisees the relevance of such values in society. The 
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idea of the subjective appeal to public reason explains why in cases such as Christian Education 
South Africa v Minister of Education “the Constitutional Court showed much genuine 
understanding for the religious entitlements…affording them the consideration of articulate 
conceptual analysis” (du Plessis 2010:29).  
 
3.3.3.3 The Objective Appeal to Public Reason   
 
As shown in De Lange v Presiding Bishop of the Methodist Church of Southern, the 
Constitutional Court can be said to have employed a subjective appeal to public reason by 
sending the appellant back to the legal process of her local Church. By contrast, in Minister of 
Home Affairs and Another v Fourie and Another and Christian Education South Africa v 
Minister of Education the Constitutional Court partly employed an objective appeal to public 
reason in dealing with the question of the influence of Christian values in the public sphere. 
An objective appeal to public reason entails that the Court goes beyond the respect for 
subjective values of Christian institutions and affirms values which are generally desirable in 
protecting the general or common interests of society. This is the case in situations where the 
Constitutional Court discerns whether or not certain Christian values which influence the 
society are justified in line with fundamental values of a democratic society.  
In South African where all Constitutionally protected rights are respected, fundamental values 
of freedom, equality and human dignity are vital to public reason. From the perspective of an 
objective appeal to public reason, in some instances the Constitutional Court avoids justifying 
its stance “on grounds of religious doctrine” (Dworkin 1991:17)125 or the subjective values of 
Christian institutions, but on “reasons accessible to all reasonable persons within the particular 
polity” (Dorfman 2008:282). Nevertheless, the Courts have been sensitive to the significance 
of Christian institutions and their values especially in accordance with the “right to freedom of 
religion” stipulated in the Constitution. As pointed out above, this was apparent in Minister of 
Home Affairs and Another v Fourie and Another126 where the Court insisted on what I consider 
to be an objective appeal to public reason.  
Seemingly, the Court affirmed an objective appeal to public reason whereby only generally 
appealing values should be upheld. By insisting on an objective appeal to public reason, the 
Court did not follow religious arguments based on Christian values but the Court had to weigh 
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them against equality, freedom and human dignity in line with public interest. The same was 
the case in Prince v President of the Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope. According to 
Pienaar (2003:128), in this case the Court found out that the “state’s interest in limiting the use 
of harmful drugs (in this case the possession of cannabis) in the interest of the public large and 
to honour international obligations exceeds the religious freedom of Rastafari to use cannabis 
in the exercise of religious practice”127.  
The common interests which are based on the objective aspect of public reason were treated as 
more essential than the internal and external aspects of the religious freedom. In that way, “the 
need to respect the values of dignity, equality and freedom therefore supplements the 
requirements of reasonableness and justifiability” (Meyerson 1997:17). Although people might 
disagree about subjective values, the Constitutional rights ought to be interpreted in such a way 
that all people or citizens are treated equally. With reference to Minister of Home Affairs and 
Another v Fourie and Another case, Lenta (2007:28-29) argues:  
in the course of debates concerning controversies, such as same-sex marriage, public reason 
precludes exclusive appeal to the truth of particular religious beliefs and doctrines or to the 
texts from which they may be derived. Arguments concerning the way in which rights should 
be interpreted should be formulated in terms of reasons that could be accepted by everyone.  
In some cases, the legal justification of Christian values and their influence in the society cannot 
always be anchored on the intrinsic value of religion but on public reasoning. Although not 
clearly, in cases where the Constitutional Court has not been able to balance the influence of 
religious values with other rights which are violated by such values, the Constitutional Court 
has had to appeal to public reason. This was clear in Minister of Home Affairs and Another v 
Fourie and Another and Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education where the 
Constitutional Court appealed to fundamental Constitutional rights in limiting the influence of 
certain Christian values in the society. From this perspective, parties in a disagreement can 
consider “themselves as appealing to a common, objective method of reasoning…they can 
therefore legitimately claim to be appealing not merely to their personal, subjective believe but 
to a common reason” (Nagel 1987:235). However, although the Constitutional Court 
emphasised an objective appeal to public reason over a subjective one in these cases, I maintain 
that the autonomy and the forcefulness of religious values in religious spheres.  
 
                                                          




3.4 Conclusion  
 
This chapter analysed the notion of religious freedom and the three strategies which serve as 
possible approaches to the predicament or clash of rights asserted in the previous chapters that 
arise from the influence of Christian values in society. The Constitutional Court’s interpretation 
of religious freedom based on the case studies explored in the previous chapter and other 
Constitutional Court cases, and also thinkers such as Mofokeng, Freedman, Pistorius, 
Meyerson and Lenta were central to the discussion. The first part of the chapter discussed the 
“right to freedom of religion” in detail. The chapter categorised religious freedom into internal 
and external aspects. Given that the internal aspect of religious freedom concerns the freedom 
of belief and the regulation of religious doctrine and values within religious circles, this aspect 
is absolute in the sense that the state cannot interfere. The external aspect of religious freedom 
on the other hand concerns the actual practice or observance of religious beliefs or values. 
Although the chapter maintained that this aspect is not absolute, in which case a certain limit 
ought to be placed, to avoid other rights being infringed, it questioned whether this might cause 
an imbalance between internal and external aspects of religious freedom.  
The second part of the chapter dealt with what this study identifies as the three strategies that 
seem to be used by the Constitutional Court and some thinkers in dealing with the problem 
where Christian values conflict with other rights and freedoms in society. Firstly, the chapter 
explicated the possibility of reconciling the involved Christian values with the rights that are 
violated. This model which some thinkers have dubbed the “positive recognition model” 
applies proportionality analysis in an attempt to balance conflicting rights. Secondly, the 
possibility of religious exemption was considered. The chapter asserted that the possibility of 
granting religious exemptions seems to be considered in cases where no rights or freedoms 
might be impinged upon. Finally, the significance of public reason was discussed in terms of 
subjective and objective senses. While the subjective appeal to public reason asserted the need 
to recognise and respect all values and rights existing in society, the objective appeal to public 
reason emphasised the centrality of generally applying values which are preeminent to 
subjective values of a religious institution. The chapter demonstrated how current scholarly 
work and the legal system approach the question. The internal and external aspects of religious 
freedom and the three strategies discussed and analysed in this chapter will serve as the 







4. Overcoming the Predicament 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter explores the possibility of overcoming the clash of rights and values arising from 
the influence of certain Christian values in South Africa’s post-1996 society from a personal 
perspective. Following discussions in previous chapters, this chapter firstly provides a 
summary on how selected thinkers and the Constitutional Court have attempted to deal with 
the predicament. The three Constitutional Court cases explored in the second chapter indicate 
that the freedom of Christian institutions to adopt or adhere to certain religious values is well-
protected by the Constitution. The manifestation of such values in society, however, is 
problematic.  
Although the Constitution stipulates freedom of religion generally, both internal and external 
aspects of religious freedom can be identified. When dealing with the external aspect of 
religious freedom, the Constitutional Court considers the possibility of reconciling the relevant 
Christian values with rights that are violated by such values. The possibility of exempting some 
Christian institutions so that they may be at liberty to influence society with Christian values 
is considered. Where the possibility of reconciling conflicting rights and exemption are not 
feasible, the Courts have affirmed the need to uphold democratic values of freedom, equality 
and human dignity as embedded in the objective appeal to public reason.128  
In the second part of the chapter, I will attempt to overcome the predicament as a contribution 
to the formidable contemporary discourse on the subject. I will uphold the argument that in 
cases where the influence of Christian values infringes upon other rights and democratic values, 
then the Christian values in question ought to be limited. In such cases, neither the possibility 
of reconciling conflicting rights nor the granting of exemptions in terms of tolerance should be 
considered. Nevertheless, in cases where the exercise of Christian values in society does not 
necessarily infringe upon the right of others, then their influence in society would be justifiable.  
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4.2 Preliminary Considerations  
 
The previous chapters have discussed the attempts of certain Christian institutions to influence 
society with Christian values. As highlighted in the second chapter, such attempts have in some 
instances caused a conflict of rights and freedoms in post-1996 South Africa. Certain Christian 
values infringe upon the rights of others by conflicting with the values of an open or free and 
democratic state of equality, freedom and human dignity and other legally protected rights and 
freedoms. The conflict is an indication that the role of Christianity and how far its values may 
be tolerated in influencing the general public or society in post-1996 South Africa remains 
unclear. How far can the impact of Christian values go in terms of influencing society with 
religious values? Should the influence of Christian values in society conflict with non-religious 
rights and democratic values, how can this difficulty be resolved?  
This study has made it clear that the South African Constitution grants various freedoms and 
rights to South African citizens and institutions to which they are entitled129. The fact that the 
Constitution guarantees religious freedom has been the primary basis for the influence of 
certain Christian values in society. How the South African Constitution guarantees religious 
freedom of belief and observance130 is stated in the first chapter. For instance, Sections 9(1) 
and 9(3) of the Constitution guarantees religious institutions the freedom to adopt and regulate 
their beliefs and values and by extension, to maintain them through practice or observances. 
Nevertheless, the Constitutional provisions on the rights of religious institutions and their place 
in society are not adequate in clarifying the extent to which Christian values can influence 
society in post-1996 democratic South Africa.  
The same was the case in the apartheid era (1948-1990) and during the period of transition 
(1990-1995). During the apartheid era, Christian values held an awkward position. Using what 
it considered to be Christian values, the NGK justified apartheid segregative policies. 
Nscokovane (1989:39) affirms that, “for the Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk, the election 
victory of the Nationalist Party in 1948 – meant monitoring of the implementation of the 
general principles of separation with regards to its approach to race relations.”  For example, 
they biblically supported the policy of separate development whereby different races had to 
reside in distinct homelands with their own healthcare and education facilities or institutions. 
Only after the 1980’s did the NGK begin to be critical of the apartheid policies and no longer 
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saw its role as justifying segregation policies. By contrast, other Christian institutions such as 
the SACC opposed the apartheid political dispensation as being against Christian values.131 
Anti-apartheid Christian institutions considered apartheid as evil and as something that had to 
be eradicated.132 They did not only consider their task as confronting unjustified political 
structures but also to “help to direct national movements towards just and worthy ends” (Villa-
Vicencio 1983:150) through resistance campaigns and submissions. The presence of both pro-
apartheid and anti-apartheid Christian institutions during the apartheid era clearly indicates that 
the influence of Christian values in society was unclear. Similarly, although most Christian 
institutions were engaged in the activities of promoting peace and reconciliation during the 
period of transition (1990-1995), their influence in society remained uncertain. This was partly 
because of the changing political milieu, during which Christian institutions increasingly 
perceived themselves as facilitators of the political negotiations and reconciliation.  
In the post-1996 democratic South Africa, the Constitution attempts to clarify the place of 
religion and its values in society but it has not succeeded very well in this regard. There have 
been problems concerning how to draw a line as to how far the influence of certain Christian 
values can be permitted in society.  This has been clear through a number of Constitutional 
Court cases in which the basis for granting freedom to Christian institutions to influence society 
with their values has on several occasions been questioned. This has been apparent especially 
in the three case studies explored in the second chapter; namely, The Christian Education South 
Africa V Minister of Education, Minister of Home Affairs and Another v Fourie and Another 
and De Lange v Presiding Bishop of the Methodist Church of Southern Africa for the Time 
Being and Another. These cases have also been explored by thinkers such as Pienaar, Lenta 
and du Plessis in their works. In these cases, the constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion 
is not only questioned but also reinterpreted.  
The above Constitutional Court cases in the South African legal system presented the Court 
with the dilemma of how to reconcile Christian values and their influence in the public sphere 
based on the Constitutional guarantees of religious rights on the one hand and the rights or 
freedoms which the influence of Christian values infringes upon in the process on the other. 
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The Constitutional Court is cautious enough not to interfere with the freedom of religious belief 
which involves the regulation of religious doctrines and the right of Christian institutions to 
adhere to certain religious values without state or legal interference. This indicates that the 
internal aspect of religious freedom is fully protected.  What the Constitutional Court and 
thinkers such as Lenta and van der Vyver have been grappling with however, is the observance 
or practice of religious values through which some religious institutions have been influencing 
society. Mofokeng (2007:130) is correct in contending that under South African law, the 
freedom of religious institutions to practice or observe their religious values by influencing 
society is not fully guaranteed.  
The previous chapter discussed three strategies in the South African legal system especially 
based on the Constitutional Court’s appraisal of freedom of religion and other related rights. In 
this discussion, thinkers such as Meyerson, Pienaar, Lenta, du Plessis and van der Vyver 
featured prominently. With regard to the ‘proportionality principle’, I argued that it is 
considered in cases where one attempts to balance differing conflicting rights or freedoms. Is 
it possible to reconcile certain Christian values with the rights on which they encroach? 
Although the process of reconciling conflicting rights might be helpful, what remains 
challenging is exactly how to maintain a fair balance in cases where Christian values violate 
the rights of others. The fact that the Constitutional Court and the acknowledged key thinkers 
have not reached agreement on the predicament or clash of rights concerning the extent of the 
influence of certain Christian values in society reaffirms the problematic and complex nature 
of the subject.  
A closer examination of the Constitutional Court’s interpretation of religious freedom based 
on the cases indicates that the Court tends to decide in favour of the influence of religious 
values on the condition that it does not overstep the rights and freedoms of others. Nevertheless, 
in cases where Christian institutions have tried to demand religious exemption or special 
allowances which would somehow lead to the contravention of the rights of others, the Court 
reaffirms its sole duty through the Constitutional principles of equality, freedom and human 
dignity to protect all legally protected rights without allowing one right or set of rights to 
unfairly interfere with third parties. But should the appeal to public reason be used to curtail 
the influence of certain religious values once they conflict with other rights? In cases such as 
Minister of Home Affairs and Another v Fourie and Another, the Constitutional Court affirmed 




values prohibiting same-sex marriages. The same was the conclusion of the Constitutional 
Court in Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education where democratic values 
such as human dignity centred on children were seen as more fundamental than the Christian 
values permitting corporal punishment on school children in the concerned Christian 
institutions.  
 
4.3 Can the Predicament Be Overcome?  
 
The question of how to resolve the predicament or clash between the influence of certain 
Christian values and other constitutionally protected rights and freedoms in society remains 
contentious. As already highlighted, this demands creating a boundary regarding how far 
Christian values can be permitted to influence people in an open and democratic society. 
Responding to this predicament also requires examining the notion of religious freedom based 
on the Constitution encompassing religious rights, the Constitutional Courts reading of these 
rights, and the views of other thinkers on the subject matter as done in the previous chapter. 
On that basis, how can one transcend the predicament or clash of rights arising from the 
influence of certain Christian values in South Africa post-1996? Generally, I do not perceive a 
problem with the influence of Christian values and convictions in society which do not 
essentially conflict with other juridically guaranteed rights as long as such an influence is 
justifiable. The influence of Christian values in society is justifiable if its influence not only 
lies within the limits required by the legal system but also when the concerned values do not 
negatively impact other rights.  
I identify a problem with Christian values that might be contrary to the legal stipulations such 
that they infringe upon the rights of others, though claim that their right to do so is legal or that 
it is protected by law. The Constitution as the supreme law of the land protects all citizens and 
institutions, both religious and non-religious. In South Africa’s democratic context, every right 
recognised by the Constitution ought to coexist with other equally protected rights without 
necessarily unfair violations. I reaffirm the notion of justified respect for the equal liberty of 
conscience, or what Nussbaum calls “equal respect for conscience” (2012:59). The avowed 
idea of equal respect for all claims of conscience requires that no right is permitted to infringe 
upon other equally permissible rights. Should certain values or rights, whether religious or not 
violate other values and rights, then a restriction ought to be placed. The difficulty lies in 




The difficulty is clear in the case studies explored in the second chapter of this study where 
certain Christian institutions in their attempt to influence society with religious values have 
ended up infringing the rights of others, and yet claim to be in accord with the law or justified 
under the Constitution. For example, like in pre-1996, the Constitution in post-1996 democratic 
South Africa has not been practically helpful in clarifying how far religious values can go in 
influencing society with their values. Nevertheless, the centrality of the Constitutional 
stipulations on religious freedom in the stressed regard cannot be underestimated. Based on 
what has been explored in the previous chapters, it is apparent that the Constitution is unclear 
on this matter, given that its stipulations on religious freedom in Sections such as 14(1), 15(2), 
15(3) and 30(1) are articulated in vague terms in the sense of being too general.   
However, like Pretorius and Mofokeng, I assert that the freedom of Christian institutions to 
regulate their doctrines and adhere to certain religious values which are based on the internal 
aspect of the “right to freedom of religion” is fully protected by the Constitution. In contrast, 
the exercise of such religious values through observance or practice in society is reasonably 
questionable, given that it is protected only to some extent. In De Lange v Presiding Bishop of 
the Methodist Church of Southern Africa for the Time Being and Another, the matter was 
referred back to the Methodist Church of Southern Africa for arbitration. The court’s decision 
indicates a certain level of autonomy granted to religious institutions as far as the internal aspect 
of religious freedom is concerned, since it necessitates the freedom of the adherents of a 
religious institution to deal with its internal religious affairs.  
From this perspective, it is appealing to reaffirm the view of Sharma (2011:224) that given 
“internal religious freedom…the Christian community is able to enjoy relatively more religious 
freedom within itself”133, the view partly hinted in the previous chapter. I accept the 
Constitutional Court’s pronouncement in De Lange v Presiding Bishop of the Methodist 
Church of Southern Africa for the Time Being and Another especially in terms of its emphasis 
on the fact that the legal system should not interfere with internal dealings of religious values 
as these are based on religious doctrine and its regulation. My basis of agreement is that such 
an aspect of religious freedom does not invade upon other constitutionally protected rights and 
democratic values. As pointed out above, I perceive the external aspect of religious freedom 
whereby certain Christian institutions attempt to influence society with religious values based 
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from state interference, and all of them allow religious groups freedom not only to worship privately but also to 




on the practice element of religious freedom as questionable. What is questionable is how to 
strike a fair balance between Constitutional stipulations of religious freedom on the one hand 
and the impact of that religious freedom in society on the others, especially in cases where such 
an impact negatively affects or harm others.   
While I have maintained that the internal aspect of religious freedom is absolute, the fact that 
the external aspect of religious freedom is not absolute and “can be subject to certain 
limitations” (Australian Human Rights Commission, 2014)134 requires emphasis. I support the 
assertion of Koshy (1992:28) that “the external aspects of religious liberty thus cannot be 
absolute, but must be seen in relation to other human rights and the human rights of all in a 
society.” The external aspect of religious liberty might affect the freedoms and rights of others 
in which case it would not be fully protected by the law and its parameters ought to be analysed. 
One may question whether the affirmed position demonstrates that Christian institutions are 
denied their rights to enjoy religious freedom in terms of practice guaranteed by the 
Constitution.  
Does placing a limitation on the external aspect of religious freedom imply that the ability of 
Christian institutions to influence society with Christian values by virtue of the constitutional 
conceded “right to freedom of religion” has been infringed? The difficulty that arises when 
certain Christian values based on the constitutionally protected right to religious freedom 
conflict with other rights is based on how the external aspect of religious freedom is interpreted 
by not only legal experts but also by Christians themselves. If the concerned Christian 
institutions in Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education argued in the 
Constitutional Court that they had the right based on the Constitutional stipulations on religious 
liberty to employ corporal punishment in their schools despite the general prohibition, then this 
had to do with their interpretation of religious freedom. 
Similarly, given that the Constitutional Court itself in the aforementioned case had to grapple 
with how to construe religious freedom, it is unclear just how far the external aspect of religious 
freedom goes in influencing society. What is clear is that the external aspect of religious 
freedom is not absolute but that it requires certain limitations. How can one determine the 
limitedness of the external aspect of religious freedom in society? Alternatively, how can one 
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determine how far Christian values should go in influencing society regardless of the 
Constitutional guarantees of religious freedom? What can be reaffirmed is the argument that 
the influence of certain religious values in society can be tolerated as long as these values do 
not conflict with other rights and freedoms. Christian institutions should be granted “justified 
toleration” in the sense that their values exist freely in society with other protected rights and 
democratic values. 
I refer to the articulated sort of toleration as “justifiable” given that the influence of Christian 
values in society does not negatively affect the rights of others, in which case avoiding placing 
limits on the influence of its values would be reasonable. It is in this sense that an exemption 
can also be considered, though the concern raised above also applies in the case of exemptions. 
In line with the notion of justifiable toleration expounded above, I perceive the need for 
justifiable exemption as captured by the question: does granting a certain exemption to a 
particular Christian institution affect other rights? Such a question is also considered by Lenta 
who reasons in line with what I have considered to be justified exemption. Lenta (2012:328) 
argues: 
would granting an exemption impose costs on third parties? This may be a reason to refuse to 
grant an exemption, or to grant an exemption more limited in scope than that claimed. We 
should, as Miller suggests, approach the issue of the costs that would be imposed by 
accommodating members of a group as a question of how the costs of cultural diversity should 
be distributed between the citizens that make up society. 
If granting an exemption to a particular Christian institution would affect other rights and 
values warranted by the Constitution or perceived as equally appealing by legal systems by 
infringing upon their rights and values, then the possibility of granting an exemption should 
not be considered135. Justifiable exemption would be granted when the influence of Christian 
values does not cause any infringements of rights in society. In that regard, I maintain that 
Christian values may exist freely and influence society in South Africa’s post-1996 as long as 
such religious values do not conflict with the other constitutional rights or liberties. This view 
is in accordance with Mill’s Harm Principle “according to which the only purpose for which 
power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, 
is to prevent harm to others” (Leiter 2012:23).136 Under the Harm Principle, there are 
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allowances in terms of granting toleration to certain values in a democratic state as long as they 
do not cause harm or violate other rights.  
Considering the Harm Principle, I agree with Arneson (1992:9) who argues that “one should 
be left free unless one’s action causes or threatens to cause harm to non-consenting others.” 
There should be clarity regarding the limits of the permitted rights and the extent to which such 
permission may be undertaken. With regards to the Harm Principle, I reiterate that the influence 
of Christian values ought to be permitted in society as long as they do not cause harm to others 
or overstep other rights and freedoms. However, even in cases where the influence of Christian 
values in society do not infringe upon the rights of others, the challenge is in how far the legal 
system can go in protecting the liberty of such values. One reasonable concern Novit (Online 
Journal of Religion and Society, 1998) raises is “that anyone with a religious objection to a law 
could simply refuse to obey it and demand an exemption as a constitutional right.” Given the 
plausibility of Novit’s concern, I maintain that some sort of restriction would be ideal even in 
cases where the influence of certain Christian values do not necessarily negatively affect other 
rights warranted by the Constitution. 
 In Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education and Minister of Home Affairs and 
Minister of Home Affairs and Another v Fourie and Another, the concerned Christian 
institutions claimed to possess the Constitutional right to influence society with religious values 
regardless of the argument that such an influence threatened the rights of others and their 
Constitutional values. If in the abovementioned cases the observance or practice of religious 
values in society violated the rights of others, then tolerating the exercise of Christian values 
in society would be unjustifiable. It would be legally and sensibly unreasonable to permit 
Christian institutions to influence society in South Africa’s post-1996 with their values if such 
an influence would negatively affect other Constitutional rights and democratic values. In terms 
of unjustifiable permission, the possibility of accommodating the influence of Christian values 
in society through the proportionality principle explored in the previous chapter in society may 
not be considered.  
The notion of balancing religious rights with other rights with which religious values conflict 
would not be ideal. However, one may bemoan what can and should be the way, in some cases 
religious institutions might have a moral obligation in the form of what Leiter calls 
“categoricity of commands” (Leiter 2012:36) to observe certain religious values even if they 




was the case in Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education where the concerned 
Christian institutions claimed that they were bound to employ corporal punishment to pupils in 
their schools based on their values which they perceived as categorical. Given that corporal 
punishment practically violates certain Constitutional rights such as children’s rights and 
human dignity as found by the Constitutional Court, I argue that the influence of Christian 
values ought to be limited in such cases.  
Permitting Christian institutions to apply corporal punishment in their educational institutions 
because they are categorically required to do so would be intolerable. Such a move does not 
diminish the fact that Christian values have served many South Africans in many ways 
throughout history, and have something positive to offer or contribute to the post-1996 
democratic situation. Although Christian values are essential to the lives of many South 
Africans, it does not follow that should the influence of such values conflict with other rights 
they cannot be curtailed. In this regard, I find appealing Grimm’s (2009:2375) claim that 
“religious freedom is neither the only constitutionally guaranteed liberty nor the highest one.” 
Christian values are part of the many liberties or human rights which the Constitution and legal 
system seek to protect.  
Following this reasoning, I consider the possibility of the objective appeal to public reason 
which has been explored in the previous chapter. With regard to the objective appeal to public 
reason, the values of equality, freedom and human dignity should be emphasised. Section 7 (1) 
of the South African Constitution under “Rights” states that the Bill of Rights “enshrines the 
rights of all people in our country and affirms the democratic values of human dignity, equality 
and freedom”. I have already emphasised that where the influence of Christian values in society 
conflict with other rights, the three democratic values which are generally applicable should be 
considered. One ought to note that where Christian values conflict with other rights or freedoms 
of third parties, there is a need to reiterate the affirmation by Lenta (2009:27) that “public 
reason precludes exclusive appeal to the truth of particular religious beliefs and doctrines or to 
the texts from which they may be derived.” The importance of certain values to Christians and 
even to society cannot undermine the centrality of democratic values as stipulated in Section 
7(1) of the Constitution. But can the influence of certain Christian values be reconciled with 
democratic values without necessarily infringing upon the rights of the third parties or other 




undermines the democratic values or other constitutionally protected rights even minimally, 
then they have to be curtailed.  
With regard to the affirmed, the decision of the Constitutional Court in limiting the influence 
of Christian values in Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education and Minister 
of Home Affairs and Another v Fourie and Another where both democratic values and other 
rights seem to have been undermined is laudable. In that sense, I maintain the foregoing 
argument that only the influence of Christian values which does not infringe upon the rights of 
others and democratic values as stipulated in the Constitution ought to be permitted to exist in 
society. Where either the democratic values or the other Constitutionally protected rights and 
values are infringed upon, then the influence of Christian values ought to be restricted. I 
substantiate this position by emphasising that even in cases where Christian values do not 
violate other rights or democratic values, the extent to which religious values influence society 
ought to be clarified. Nevertheless, given the contentious and complex nature of the “right to 
freedom of religion” in line with the current discussion, clarifying the parameters the place of 
Christian and other religious values in society and how far they can go in influencing society 
is imperative in transcending the predicament or clash of rights.  
 
4.4 Conclusion  
 
Overcoming the predicament or conflict of rights arising from religious freedom through which 
some Christian institutions violate other Constitutionally guaranteed rights in the process of 
influencing society with their values is not straightforward. The first section of this chapter 
explored major arguments made in the previous chapters. It emphasised that the Constitutional 
guarantees of the “right to freedom of religion” and other related rights do not offer a clear 
basis for dealing with this predicament. The Constitution does not clearly stipulate to what 
extent religious values can go in society with regard to freedom of religion. The Constitutional 
Court through a number of cases it has dealt with, sheds light on how the predicament or clash 
of rights can be transcended to a greater extent. Apart from attempting to reconcile certain 
Christian values with the Constitutional rights they violate, there has been recourse to 
exemptions.  
Should a case arise whereby the influence of Christian values in society does not violate 
Constitutional rights, the possibility of granting them an exemption should be considered. 




democratic values, certain limits would have to be placed on the concerned Christian values. 
In that sense, Christian values can influence society in a way that such values do not negatively 
affect the free exercise of other legally protected rights and democratic values of equality, 
human dignity and freedom. From the perspective of an objective appeal to public reason, the 
chapter strongly maintained that where the influence of Christian values threatens the rights of 

































This study was an attempt to critically understand and transcend the predicament or clash of 
rights arising from the influence of certain Christian values in society in South Africa post-
1996. The study emphasised that the predicament arises when the influence of Christian values 
in society violates other constitutionally guaranteed rights and democratic values. In view of 
this aim, the study considered the Constitutional Court’s interpretation of religious freedom 
and other key thinkers. As a foundation to the study, the first chapter discussed the 
Constitutional basis for religious freedom, which is the backbone of the influence of Christian 
values in society. Although Sections 14(1), 15(2), 30(1) and 15(3) of the Bill of Rights clearly 
stipulate the rights relating to religious freedom, these rights require interpretation given that 
as it stands it does not clarify what freedom of religion actually entails.  
I maintained that the Constitutional stipulations on religious freedom are the foundation for 
any contemporary discussion of religious freedom as a Constitutionally guaranteed right. 
Furthermore, the first chapter drew attention to the State-Religion relations by affirming that 
the South African model is grounded on state neutrality and plurality. Christian institutions are 
guaranteed the freedom to participate in the makeup of society; and by implication, to influence 
society with their values. Nevertheless, I affirmed that such a model requires that the state treats 
all worldviews with equality and fairness. I also gave a historical overview on how Christian 
values affected society between 1948 and 1995, especially through pro-apartheid and anti-
apartheid church organisations. In essence, the first chapter discussed the backbone of the study 
which was central in understanding the basis of the research.  
The second chapter expounded on the Constitutional Court’s construing of religious freedom. 
In its attempt to clarify the predicament or conflict of rights, the chapter upheld that certain 
Christian values conflict with other Constitutionally conceded rights in society. This was 
demonstrated by the three Constitutional Court cases which exposed instances where certain 
Christian values actually violated other rights and democratic values in South Africa post-1996. 
While discussing these Constitutional Court cases by pointing out the arguments and 
judgements concerned, I offered a brief analysis of each case. The chapter demonstrated that 
the complexity of how to determine the extent to which Christian values can influence society 
cannot be underrated. However, the Constitutional Court cases show how the legal system tries 




The third chapter examined the notion of religious freedom and the three strategies or 
approaches to the predicament or conflict of rights from the perspective of the Constitutional 
Court and selected thinkers. I categorised religious freedom into internal and external aspects 
and argued that the external aspect ought to be subjected to certain limitations. Unlike the 
internal aspect, the external aspect of religious freedom might affect third parties to the extent 
of infringing upon their rights. The chapter also identified three strategies that seem to be 
applied in legal systems and scholarly work, based on a personal reflection on the discourse. 
The chapter discussed the proportionality model whereby different conflicting rights can be 
reconciled without any rights being infringed. The second strategy I discussed is the notion of 
religious exemption, whereby certain Christian values might be permitted to exist in society. 
Under this strategy, I argued that only in cases where such an exemption would not violate 
other rights can the possibility of an exemption be considered. I concluded the third chapter by 
looking at what I characterised as the subjective and objective appeals to public reason. In this 
regard, it was emphasised that based on the objective appeal to public reason, the generally 
applying values should be considered as prior to subjective or particular values and rights.  
The fourth chapter affirmed that Christian values which neither conflict with Constitutionally 
protected rights nor democratic values should be allowed in society through what I dubbed as 
justified toleration and Mill’s Harm Principle. In contrast, Christian values which not only 
impact other rights negatively but which are also contrary to democratic values should not be 
permitted in society. This position would be feasible given that in an “open and democratic 
society” different rights ought to coexist without conflicting with each other. However, given 
that sometimes different rights might conflict, there is a need for clarification on how far 
religious values can be tolerated in the public sphere from a legal perspective; otherwise, there 
will be always be cases similar to those explored in the second chapter. Although the notion of 
justified toleration and the objective appeal to public reason I proposed would be viable, the 
complexity of the predicament or clash of rights indicates that new strategies ought to be put 
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